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INTRODUCTION
It is by now widely recognised that effectively tackling forced 
labour in the global economy means addressing its ‘root causes’. 
Policymakers, business leaders and civil society organisations all 
routinely call for interventions that do so.1-2 Yet what exactly are these root causes? 
And how do they operate?
The two most commonly given answers are ‘poverty’ and ‘globalisation’.3 Although 
each may be foundational to forced labour, both terms are typically used in nebu-
lous, catch-all ways that serve more as excuses than explanations. Both encompass 
and obscure a web of decisions and processes that maintain an unjust status quo, 
while being used as euphemisms for deeper socio-economic structures that lie at 
the core of the capitalist global economy. 
The question thus becomes: exactly which aspects of poverty and globalisation 
are responsible for the endemic labour exploitation frequently described with the 
terms forced labour, human trafficking or modern slavery? Which global economic 
1The political economy of forced labour
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processes ensure a constant and low-cost supply of highly exploitable and coerced 
workers? And which dynamics trigger a demand among businesses for their ex-
ploitation, making it possible for them to profit from it? 
This 12-part report is an attempt to answer these questions in a rigorous yet accessi-
ble way. With it, we hope to provide policymakers, journalists, scholars and activists 
with a road map for understanding the political economy of forced labour in today’s 
“global value chain world”.4 
The Beyond Trafficking and 
Slavery study 
Why is this important? First, because 
although awareness is growing that 
exploitation is structural – in the sense 
that systemic forces underpin the fact 
that some people are exploited while 
others are not – little has been done to 
explain how these forces operate, what 
causes them, or why they have not yet 
been overcome. 
Second, while calls to address root 
causes are now commonplace, there 
remains a distinct lack of discussion 
about what doing so should precisely 
entail. This poses huge problems for 
policy-makers and activists, because 
if we cannot understand the issues we 
face, we are limited in what we can do about them. We are also more likely to mistake 
symptoms for causes, wasting precious resources on treating the former without ever 
achieving real gains on the latter. 
Indeed, millions are spent every year on efforts to prevent forced labour.5 Yet that 
expenditure often amounts to little, since most policymakers and activists lack a 
comprehensive theory to guide their actions. This deficit causes them to shy away 
from pushing for bigger and more politicised change, instead favouring small-scale, 
isolated interventions that can be marketed as concrete and measurable ‘wins’.6 The 
resulting programmes are often like Band-Aids, and have minimal impact on exist-
What do we mean by 
forced labour?
This report uses a broader definition of ‘forced labour’ 
than the standard international definition discussed 
in the next chapter. We include work brought about 
by physical, psychological or economic coercion 
and recognise that, despite lacking the alternatives 
needed to defend against such coercion, workers’ 
frequently retain and exhibit agency when entering 
into coercive labour relations.
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ing structures of power within the global economic system. Worse still, they often 
do more harm than good to the people they are supposed to be helping.7-12
It is time for policy and activism to address these failings, to confront the root caus-
es of severe exploitation, and to do so in a systemic and informed fashion. With 
the hope of sparking a conversation that will help them do this, we have drawn 
together existing research on the political economy of forced labour in global value 
chains (GVCs) to provide an overview of its root causes. Our source material has 
been gathered from across a range of academic disciplines and includes country and 
industry-specific cases, ethnographic investigations, statistical studies and relevant 
non-academic data. We also draw upon the canon of historical and theoretical work 
accounting for forced labour in the modern economy.
The picture of forced labour that we present in this report departs markedly from 
prevailing discussions of modern slavery. Much recent analysis tends to conceptu-
alise the deepening and expansion of markets as the solution to forced labour.13 By 
contrast, we see the problem of forced labour as intrinsically linked to core dynamics 
of the global economy. Soaring levels of inequality, indecent work, concentrations of 
corporate power and ownership, shifting legal and governance regimes – these are 
all factors that render workers increasingly unprotected in the face of ever-harsher 
market forces. 
What do we mean by political economy?
Political economy refers to the underlying social and political mechanisms and principles that structure systems 
of social organisation. These are the girders and tent poles propping up and giving shape to our everyday lives. 
Structures that matter for this discussion include race, gender, caste, legal systems, and the market economy.
 
The study of political economy is the study of these structures. It examines the ‘rules of the game’, rather the ac-
tions of any individual player. It is also the study of power and its unequal distribution, specifically the power to 
affect the shape of the global economy. Today the actors with the power to do that include major corporations 
and industry bodies, as well as politicians, governments and inter-governmental organisations.
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Overview of the report
This report is organised around a metaphor – the classical economic metaphor of 
‘supply and demand’. Within mainstream economic theory, the price of any particu-
lar good is not determined by the individuals who buy and sell it. Instead, the price 
results from a system-wide balance between how much of it is available in the world 
(supply), how many people want it, and how badly (demand). The price goes up 
as supply decreases or as demand increases, and down if the opposite applies. This 
is a useful way of thinking about forced labour. Rather than a simple consequence 
of greed or the moral shortcomings of individuals, forced labour in global supply 
chains is a structural phenomenon that results when predictable, system-wide dy-
namics intersect to create a supply of highly exploitable workers and a business 
demand for their labour. 
Our report looks at eight of these dynamics: four relating to supply and four relating 
to demand. On the supply side, the four dynamics we look at all contribute to cre-
ating a pool of workers vulnerable to exploitation. These include:
• Poverty, which we understand to entail the legally-created deprivation 
of material and social resources;
• Identity and discrimination, by which we understand the denial to 
some people of the rights and status of full personhood, e.g. along lines 
of race and gender;
• Limited labour protections, which create pools of unprotected workers 
outside the remit of state safeguards, who face serious barriers to acting 
collectively and exerting rights; 
• Restrictive mobility regimes, which do the same. 
Each of the elements we have chosen to look at on the demand side either create 
pressure within the market for highly exploitable forms of labour or open up spaces 
within which that labour can be exploited. All of these dynamics are integral to the 
nature of global supply chains as they are currently constituted. They include:
• Concentrated corporate power and ownership, which creates huge 
downward pressure on working conditions, in part by lowering the 
share of value available to workers as wages; 
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• Outsourcing, which fragments responsibility for labour standards and 
makes oversight and accountability very difficult;
• Irresponsible sourcing practices, that put heavy cost and time pres-
sures on suppliers, which can lead to risky practices like unauthorised 
subcontracting; 
• Governance gaps, which are intentionally created around and within 
supply chains, opening up spaces for bad practice.
Each of these eight dynamics shall be dealt with in turn over the subsequent chapters.
Before we take a closer look at these factors, however, we must first lay out the con-
ceptual foundations of our analysis. In the next two chapters, we define key terms 
and articulate a theory of the concept of freedom. We believe this to be essential 
both for understanding the root causes of forced labour and for building progressive 
political responses to them. We also break apart the apolitical history of globalisa-
tion, which we argue is a political and historical process designed by and for the 
powerful, rather than some neutral consequence of autonomous market forces. It is 
to such theoretical foundations that we now turn.
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF FORCED LABOUR
Poverty Concentrated corporate power and ownership
Identity and discrimination Outsourcing
Limited labour protection Irresponsiblesourcing practices
Restrictive mobility regimes Governance gaps
SUPPLY DEMAND
FORCED LABOUR
CONCEPTS
Many international agencies and non-governmental organisa-
tions (NGOs) simultaneously endorse the accepted legal defini-
tion of forced labour and the claim that poverty is its primary 
root cause. We argue that this stance is highly contradictory, and that those who 
believe that economic dynamics like poverty are the root cause of forced labour 
need a broader understanding of freedom and coercion in order to better make 
sense of the phenomena they seek to address.
Damaging definitions 
Forced labour is defined in international law as “all work or service which is exacted 
from any person under the menace of any penalty and for which the said person has 
not offered himself voluntarily”. The guardian of this definition, the International 
Labour Organisation (ILO), has further elaborated that the threat of penalty “can 
take various forms, whether physical, psychological, financial or other”.1 However, 
it has also made clear that it understands coercion primarily as restricted to individ-
2Forced labour and the meaning of freedom
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ualised acts perpetrated by governments or employers. According to its Committee 
of Experts:
An external constraint or indirect coercion interfering with a worker’s free-
dom to “offer himself voluntarily” may result not only from an act of the 
authorities … but also from an employer’s practice … However, the employer 
or the State are not accountable for all external constraints or indirect coercion 
existing in practice: for example, the need to work in order to earn one’s living.2 
(emphasis added)
What is most disturbing about this is that it negates the key form of coercion found 
in market society, namely economic necessity. The ILO takes it as a given that people 
will be forced to sell their labour to survive unless they are wealthy enough to avoid 
having to do so. Yet this idea – that ‘real’ coercion can only ever be perpetrated by one 
individual against another – prevents the ILO and likeminded institutions from un-
derstanding where the force in ‘forced labour’ comes from in a large number of cases. 
A simple scenario from one of the poorer regions of the world will suffice to make 
this point concrete. Imagine you are a subsistence farmer with a young family to 
support. You have no money and your crops earn very little, in part because much 
of the return is paid to the multinational companies supplying you with fertiliser 
and seed. If everyone in your household remains fit and healthy you can just about 
get by, but your daughter has just fallen seriously ill. Remember, this is a poor and 
rural area and there is no clinic nearby. There is a hospital in the nearest town but 
it is expensive and far away, and there is no social safety net to pay for her care or 
for your travel. This leaves you with only one option – to borrow money. But doing 
so creates new problems, since the only person willing to lend to someone in your 
position charges a hefty sum. And as you both know, you will never be able to repay 
him, so he offers you a choice: either you work his crops or you make clothes in his 
brother’s factory for a year without pay. Or, your daughter could die. What do you 
do? And who here is guilty of coercion?
It is important to emphasise that this is not a whimsical example. A wealth of re-
search shows that people all over the world routinely make choices such as this, 
submitting themselves to precisely these kinds of exploitative labour relationships 
because doing so represents their best or only available option.3-10 Under conditions 
where menace of penalty are also present (such as the use of violence, intimidation, 
or threats of non-payment of due wages), the political establishment refers to them 
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as ‘forced labourers’ and holds only the moneylender responsible for their plight. 
But is that appropriate? This report argues that it is not. Instead, we argue that pin-
pointing blame in this individualised way is neither an acceptable nor an accurate 
distribution of responsibility. The farmer above was given a choice and he took it. 
Although the moneylender may have taken advantage of the fact that the farmer 
had no better option, the fact that the farmer had no better option is not the fault of 
the moneylender. To focus narrowly on the moneylender is thus to miss the deeper, 
underlying structures that make his predatory offer possible. 
In our analysis, the real problem is less that the farmer was ‘forced’ by the money-
lender to do work that he did not want to do, though this type of lending obviously 
takes advantage of the farmer’s desperation, and the use of intimidation, violence, 
or threats is not appropriate under any circumstance. Rather, it is that this exploit-
ative exchange was the best choice the farmer had. And responsibility for that fact 
lies with the power-brokers organising our social world, who have ensured that 
money is a pre-requisite to survival and yet left the farmer with none of it, with no 
healthcare and with no social protection.11  
Poverty and freedom
Let’s now return to poverty and root causes. We said at the outset that there is a con-
tradiction between accepting the ILO definition of and approach to forced labour and 
believing that poverty is its underlying root cause. At the centre of this contradiction 
is the way that freedom is typically understood.
In mainstream political thinking – and certainly in the thinking that structures in-
ternational law12 and policy around forced labour – freedom is understood in nega-
tive terms, i.e. as ‘freedom from’ something.13 Accordingly, we are understood to be 
free to the extent that no one interferes with us, and unfree to the extent that they 
do. Negative conceptions of freedom inform the dominant neoclassical understand-
ings of the market that were developed by thinkers like Friedrich Hayek and Milton 
Friedman. They argued that capitalist markets are characterised by voluntary, free 
and equal exchange between individuals, and that workers are free so long as they 
experience an “absence of coercion” from other individuals.14 
Negative conceptions of freedom, however, do not square with the idea of poverty 
as a root cause of forced labour. A root cause is a fundamental reason for the occur-
rence of a problem – an underlying, original source of action which sets in motion 
a chain of other actions and leads to a particular event. But poverty is no more than 
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an abstract concept. It has no power on its own, and certainly cannot force anyone 
to labour involuntarily or under the menace of penalty. 
As such, when we say that poverty is a root cause of forced labour, we are really saying 
that we understand the poor to be pushed into situations of exploitative or forced 
work by the fact that they lack viable alternatives. We therefore acknowledge that an 
abstract freedom from interference – as might be found in a constitution entitling all 
citizens to be ‘free’ – is not enough to guarantee the exercise of that freedom. Only the 
freedom to resist interference can accomplish that. This acknowledgement that true 
‘freedom from’ only exists with an accompanying ‘freedom to’ is of major significance, 
since it means that within the story that ‘poverty is a root cause of forced labour’ 
there exists an enormously powerful 
and more positive theory of freedom 
– a freedom anchored in the power to 
say no.15 
Implications
What are the implications of this the-
ory of freedom? First of all, it compels 
us to expand our understanding of 
key concepts, such as coercion and 
vulnerability, from the personal to 
the structural. Individual instances of 
exploitation rely on one side having 
no viable or superior alternatives to 
what is on offer, and thus extremely 
limited power to say no. Yet unless 
we believe this lack of alternatives to 
occur naturally like the rain, we have 
no choice but to acknowledge that it derives from the human arrangement of social, 
political and economic affairs. The ‘bad guy’ in this story, therefore, is not just the 
unscrupulous person offering exploitative work to people who need to take it. It is 
the system which ensures that taking it is the best option those people have. 
This recognition, in turn, requires us to rethink vulnerability as well. Vulnerability is 
commonly understood as a static or individual notion attached to individual types 
of people, often rooted in gendered and racialised narratives of victimhood. (Think 
‘women and children’, for example, in the standard discourse).16-17 But according to 
When we say that poverty is 
a root cause of forced labour, 
we are really saying that we 
understand the poor to be 
pushed into situations of 
exploitative or forced work by 
the fact that they lack viable 
alternatives.
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our thinking, a fuller understanding of vulnerability must attend to the fact that it is 
relational, and that it could entail inhabiting a position within society that involves 
structural limits being placed on one’s available alternatives.18 Poverty – which we 
conceive of as the state of being denied access to society’s wealth – is one such struc-
tural limit. But there are others, as we will be discussing throughout this report. 
Together, they combine to ensure the supply of workers who can be subjected to 
labour exploitation, including its most severe forms.
Finally, if the limits on people’s freedom to say no are neither randomly nor natural-
ly distributed, we need to ask ourselves who or what is responsible for them? Who is 
responsible for arranging social, political and economic affairs such that only a small 
number of people enjoy the power to say no to the coercion inherent to the market 
while the vast majority do not? Who or what, ultimately, shapes the ‘root causes’ of 
forced labour? As you will see throughout this report, we hold governments, em-
ployers and the powerful very much to account. And in doing so, we challenge the 
notion that capitalist markets are harmonious, equal and natural institutions, and 
that their expansion entails a solution to the problem of forced labour. 
CONCEPTS
Former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan is rumoured to have 
once complained that arguing against globalisation is like arguing 
against the laws of gravity. So widely accepted is its inevitability 
that most never question its nature, and those who do still see it as unstoppable. 
This aura is powerfully depoliticising. It implies that, for good or ill, globalisation 
just is – like gravity, an impersonal force shaping our lives and beyond our control. 
This is why, when globalisation is given as a reason for something, the speaker often 
accompanies her explanation with a slight shrug of defeat. The ILO, for example, 
famously labelled forced labour as the “underside of globalisation”, implying it to 
be just some bad accompaniment to an inevitable event.1 We seek a stronger expla-
nation, however, to understand the links between globalisation and forced labour.
Neoliberalisation and its architects
The term ‘globalisation’ has become an everyday shorthand for the complex mix 
of social, cultural, political and economic change characterising our times: the 
3Globalisation and the rise of supply chains
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heightened exchange of information 
and ideas; the increased mobility of 
people and money; and especially the 
transnational integration of produc-
tion, investment and trade.2 Having a 
catch-all term for the world’s increas-
ing complexity and interconnected-
ness is useful, but it does not get us 
any closer to explaining why, how, 
or at whose behest these changes are 
taking place. This makes it a poor ex-
planatory tool for forced labour.
In our view, it is more useful to speak 
of neoliberal or capitalist globalisation, 
or better still ‘neoliberalisation’. Neo-
liberalism, in the words of geographer 
David Harvey, is primarily a theory of 
capitalist governance that sees human 
well-being as best advanced through 
“liberating individual entrepreneur-
ial freedoms” against a backdrop of 
“strong private property rights, free 
markets, and free trade”.3 
Unlike amorphous globalisation, 
neoliberalisation can be traced, dis-
sected and analysed as a distinct pol-
icy framework. Its proponents have 
names, its guiding ideas and recipes 
for action are known, and its policies 
produce recognisable patterns of con-
sequences as they propagate through-
out the world. This gives it far more 
explanatory power for why the world 
looks the way it does today.
The project of 
neoliberalisation
Neoliberalisation has been a dominant policy 
paradigm since the 1970s, centred around the 
following core trends:
• increased capital mobility and exposure to 
international trade;
• structural reorientations in favour of shareholder 
value and financialisation;
• the generalised intensification of competitive 
pressures, speculation and short-termism;
• widespread evasion and externalisation of the 
costs of social and ecological reproduction;
• the development of various forms of state 
outsourcing, devolved governance and lean 
bureaucracy; 
• the weakening of specific national government 
capacities, especially with respect to sociospatial 
redistribution and long-term (public, social) 
investment.
Source: Peck, 2010: 29.
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Originating in the work of scholars like Hayek and Friedman – who were prominent 
in the elevation of the market to its current status – neoliberalisation has been driv-
en primarily by business elites, their allies in Western governments and institutions 
such as the World Bank. Its philosophy conceives of all individuals as potential en-
trepreneurs and of markets as society’s primary and ‘natural’ organising force: we 
get what we pay for, pay for what we can, and reduce the government’s role to that 
of a policeman protecting our property. 
What has this meant in practice? For four decades, governments around the world 
have pushed – and, in the case of poor countries, have been pushed – to remove 
most subsidies and tariffs; to roll back the social protections serving as safety nets 
for those in need; to reduce anti-poverty redistribution and privatise public goods 
provision; to allow large-scale foreign direct investment; and to reinforce power 
imbalances between workers and employers.4-12
The promise of all this has been of a new dawn of prosperity, with creative energies 
liberated and market efficiency fostered by the state getting out of the way of freely 
chosen, voluntary exchanges between workers and employers. Neoliberalism would 
improve the lives of western consumers by bringing them ever-cheaper goods from 
overseas; while for Southern workers the carrot has been nothing less than an end to 
poverty itself, through inclusion into the world market as producers of those goods. 
This is where global supply chains enter the picture.
The growth of global supply chains
The chances are that you are reading this on a computer, tablet or smart phone. If so, 
you are sitting at the end of a long and winding global supply chain. Today, a typical 
computer might contain a memory chip from Malaysia, a battery from Indonesia, 
a screen from South Korea, RAM from Germany and a hard drive made in Thai-
land. This all before it was assembled in China and bought off a shelf in New York, 
Buenos Aires, or wherever you may be.13 Apple, the company from which you may 
have bought it, sources its parts from a global network spread across over a dozen 
countries, including China, India, Italy, Indonesia, Ireland, the Philippines, Puerto 
Rico, Singapore, Malaysia and the Czech Republic.14
This reflects a key shift in global production practices spurred by neoliberalisation. 
It has engendered the rise of a new, international division of labour in which vast 
brand and retail companies coordinate production across a panoply of sub-con-
tracted suppliers located all over the Global South.15-19 Initially, lead firms were 
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predominantly Western, but today there are a growing number of large companies 
located in the ‘rising powers’ which also make use of global supply chains to pro-
duce their products.20  
Today, companies such as Tesco or Nike design and sell products but produce 
very little themselves. That crucial middle step is outsourced to smaller firms in an 
attempt to expand profits and reduce legal liability. For instance, mega-company 
Nestlé has almost 165,000 direct suppliers and 695,000 individual farmers world-
wide.21 Many supply chains cut across 
transnational borders to take advan-
tage of lower labour costs and weaker 
labour protections in other countries, 
but some also remain concentrated 
within national borders.22-23
As we further explore in chapter 8, the 
reorganisation of global production 
has led to monopolisation, soaring 
profits and the rise of corporations 
whose scale and political power has 
hitherto been unknown. Apple is of-
ficially the world’s most valuable ever 
company and holds cash reserves of 
over US$200 billion.24 The United 
Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development (UNCTAD) has esti-
mated that the productive networks 
coordinated by firms like this encom-
pass fully 80% of world trade, with 
one in five jobs linked to their oper-
ations.25-26 Indeed, as scholars Peter Dauvergne and Jane Lister observe, “one third 
of global gross domestic product (GDP) and 70% of all employment and activity 
in developed countries are now tied to retail”, with firms like Costco and Carrefour 
leading the way.27 
The links to forced labour
What does all of this have to do with forced labour? And which aspects of global-
isation are important for our understanding of it? There are many, and it will be 
SIMPLIFIED GARMENT SUPPLY CHAIN
Input Suppliers
Processors / Traders
Exporters Wholesalers
Source: Emilia Saarelainen and Merten Sievers (2011) ‘ILO Value 
Chain Development Briefing Paper 2: The Role of Cooperatives 
and Business Associations in Value Chain Development’. 
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End Markets
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the task of this report to spell those out in greater detail. For now, however, let us 
underline a few key points.
First, the global spread of neoliberal models of market and social governance has 
been neither an organic nor an even development. It has happened as a result of elite, 
powerful actors pushing through changes in the interests of big business, financial 
capital and the wealthy. It is and always has been an inherently unequal project that 
has been shown to deepen inequality.28-29
Second, this rising inequality has thrown onto the global labour market a vast army 
of people so poor and lacking in state protections that they epitomise the inability 
to say no to exploitation.30-31 In Mexico, for example, the number of people living 
in extreme poverty rose by 500% at the height of neoliberalising reforms, between 
1994 and 2000.32 In much of Africa, real wages declined substantially around the 
same time period, with average household food consumption falling to 25% lower 
than it was a quarter century previously.33  
Numerous factors explain this immiseration, and the specific dynamics at work vary 
across industries and regions of the world. One of the most pernicious, particularly 
in the agricultural sector (where existing research has documented severe labour 
exploitation to be disproportionately concentrated),34 is that the global reduction 
in tariffs and subsidies has proceeded in highly unequal fashion. That is, while 
poorer countries have typically removed their protections under pressure from the 
rich, the rich have often failed to follow suit.35 For example, despite urging African 
countries to liberalise their cotton sectors, the US government subsidised American 
cotton-growing multinationals by over US$13 billion between 1996 and 2002 – a 
per-kilogram price subsidy of almost 50%.36 This decimated much African cotton 
production.37-38 These and similar trends are key to explaining why we see forced 
labour in the cotton industry, and indeed, in many other industries.39 
Third, many of the dispossessed farmers and other workers impacted by these sorts 
of changes end up at the bottom of supply chains, where they face highly predatory 
business practices from more powerful firms. The companies directing many supply 
chains command enormous power in the global economy, which they use to control 
as well as reduce the costs of production.40- 41 They do this, for example, by imposing 
short-term contracts, penalties and fees for late or low-quality orders. They also 
float disproportionate profits to the top of value chains by demanding razor thin 
margins at the bottom.42
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In the words of Nelson Lichtenstein, big brands squeeze their suppliers “by shifting 
every imaginable cost, risk, and penalty onto their books”.43 This, in turn, places 
major pressure on suppliers to balance their own books through the use of coercive, 
exploitative, and otherwise unacceptable labour practices. As later chapters of this 
report make clear, extensive research now shows correlations between such lead 
firm practices and the widespread abuse and exploitation of workers.44-45 
For the next eight chapters, we explore these structural supply and demand factors 
in detail.
SUPPLY
It is empirically indisputable that vulnerability to forced labour 
is shaped by poverty.1-3 This chapter will draw on research from 
across several sectors and regions of the world to illustrate how 
market coercion interacts with poverty to create a supply of people vulnerable to 
forced labour.
Poverty and the market
The cold, hard truth of market societies is that you need wealth – or, more precisely, 
money – to obtain the necessities of life and thus to survive. If you do not have mon-
ey and nobody is prepared to give you the food, water, medicine, shelter and other 
things you require, you will die. This is the ‘invisible hand’ of the market in action. 
Lacking money, huge swathes of the world’s population never enjoy the effective 
power to say no to coercion or exploitation, and so are systematically vulnerable to 
forced labour.
4Poverty
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Before delving into the data, it is important to be clear that this is not a natural 
state of affairs. Nor is it an accidental but inevitable consequence of globalisation 
and economic growth. Rather, poverty – along with the perpetuation of exploitative 
labour relations – is written into the very DNA of global capitalism.4
We explored this theoretically in chapter 2 and gave an example of the peasant farm-
er accepting debt bondage as an illustration of how market societies force people 
to accept exploitative work, prioritising short-term survival needs over long-term 
economic security. In this chapter, we will provide further examples of the interplay 
between poverty and forced labour to illustrate how global and national markets 
rely on – and perpetuate – the supply of people vulnerable to exploitation.  
The big picture
In 2015, the ILO estimated that more than 75% of the global workforce was in tem-
porary, informal or unpaid work, meaning that only a quarter of workers have the 
security of permanent contracts.5 Four in 10 young workers are either unemployed 
or working but living in poverty,6 while as of 2014, over 200 million people were 
entirely unemployed. This is 31 million more than before the start of the global 
financial crisis in 2008,7 with that number being expected to increase further.8 In 
fact, between 1981 and 2008, the number of people living on between US$1.25 and 
US$2 a day doubled worldwide.9
Taken together, these statistics show that the ranks of the “working poor”10 are con-
stantly expanding. In a context where corporate profits are at their highest levels in 
nearly a century,11 the majority of the world’s workers lack the certainty that they 
will earn a sufficient living from their work and almost half of the world’s working 
young people have next-to-no income security. All of which raises the question: 
why is poverty so resilient in the face of unprecedented wealth? 
The restructuring of global and national economies along neoliberal lines (as de-
scribed in chapter 3) is a major part of the answer. For the past four decades, neo-
liberal restructuring has divorced millions across the global south from their means 
of subsistence, whilst simultaneously slashing the social protection mechanisms on 
which they and their families relied.12-13 Dispossessed and abandoned by the state, 
they have had few means with which to resist being integrated into the cash econo-
my on unequal and often highly coercive terms. 
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In other words, the intensified need to obtain money to secure the necessities of 
life has underpinned the integration of millions of people into the labour market, 
but because they are poor, they have had very little scope or power to shape their 
working conditions. They have thus entered into dangerous, risky, insecure or poor-
ly remunerated employment relations, because doing so has been their only way to 
meet urgent needs. 
Adverse incorporation
Although the dominant understanding of poverty within mainstream economic 
thinking is that it is ‘residual’ – a pure consequence of exclusion from the market 
economy – research shows that one can be included in the labour market and still be 
very poor.14 Indeed, for many people inclusion actually worsens their circumstances 
and puts them at risk. 
For example, Nicola Phillips and Leonardo Sakamoto’s mapping of forced labour 
in Brazil’s cattle sector shows that those most likely to be in forced labour are not 
actually the very poorest. For them, some social protections still exist. Instead, 
those most at risk are earning slightly above the income threshold for social welfare 
protections, and are therefore almost exclusively dependent on earned income to 
survive.15 People caught in this situation are commonly referred to as the ‘working 
poor’ and, as noted above, their numbers are growing. 
Phillips describes situations like what she and Sakamoto observed in Brazil as “ad-
verse incorporation”.16 The central insight of this concept is that when people are 
compelled to undertake wage labour on bad terms, this can entrench their pover-
ty and vulnerability by preventing them from accumulating wealth or achieving 
long-term economic security. The dynamics of adverse incorporation are circular, 
which means that while poverty shapes people’s vulnerability to exploitation, their 
exploitation also reinforces their inability to escape poverty.17 
The use of children to produce garments in home-based settings in India demon-
strates how this works. A survey conducted by Phillips shows that, out of a sample of 
201 households, almost 70% used children to fulfil piece-work orders from garment 
manufacturers, and for the most part the children received little or no money for 
their labour.18 This system of production will have both immediate and long-term 
effects. By doing piece-work now, the children will likely eat tomorrow. However, the 
self-reinforcing nature of their adverse incorporation means that working now will 
make it less likely that they obtain better work in the future. By prioritising short-
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term survival over long-term security – when doing otherwise is extremely difficult, 
if not lethal – they must forego schooling or other opportunities to strengthen their 
bargaining power in the labour market. This prevents them from ‘upgrading’ to-
wards more skilled, secure and better-paid employment prospects and entrenches 
their poverty further.19-20  
The ‘multidimensional’ character of poverty
The experience of ‘poverty’ cannot therefore be reduced only to a lack of money. 
Poverty is “multidimensional”, as economics professor Sabina Alkire has made clear, 
meaning that those at the bottom of the socio-economic ladder are statistically 
more likely to face a mutually reinforcing bundle of disadvantages that combine to 
perpetuate their destitution.21 These include poor health, poor sanitation, food in-
security or a lack of education. Each may interact with the lack of money to increase 
an individual’s vulnerability to forced labour.
To take but one quantitative example, a multi-country study from the ILO examin-
ing the backgrounds of formally identified victims of forced labour finds that those 
originating from food insecure households or households that have recently expe-
rienced a sharp decline in revenue are much more likely to end up in situations of 
forced labour than others.22 In Nepal, for instance, only 9% of documented forced 
labourers came from food secure households, in contrast to 56% who came from 
households that were food insecure.23 
Education is another good example of the multidimensional aspect of poverty. 
Monetarily poor people are more likely to be educationally poor because they are 
obliged to prioritise short-term survival over formal training. The child labourers 
producing garments in India demonstrated this in the previous section. A lack of 
education, in turn, reduces bargaining power in the labour market, making it more 
likely that the only jobs on offer will come with poor conditions.24
Data from a range of studies now show a strong correlation between illiteracy or low 
levels of schooling and the likelihood of experiencing forced labour. In Brazil, for 
example, nearly 70% of workers identified by the government as “slaves” between 
2003 and 2009 were either illiterate or had a maximum of four years of schooling,25 
while in Armenia, Georgia and the Republic of Moldova, forced labourers were 
found to be on aggregate less educated than the “freely employed”.26
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Debt bondage and poverty’s many faces 
Nowhere is poverty’s role in creating a supply of people vulnerable to forced labour 
clearer than with debt. Debt, as anyone who has had any knows, can be a powerful 
disciplinary mechanism.27 Loans or advances – along with other measures such as 
withholding wages – are frequently used to discipline and coerce workers. In richer 
countries, this affects migrant workers who take out large loans to fund their travel 
and find themselves with no choice but to work highly exploitative contracts to pay 
them back.28-31 In poorer countries, debt captures and disciplines the working poor 
who lack access to cheap credit and thus cannot absorb economic shocks when they 
come along.
Verité’s reports on the Guatemalan sugar sector, the palm oil industry in Ecuador 
and the production of electronic goods in Malaysia provide further evidence for 
how the intersection of debt, withholding wages, and exploitative recruitment 
practices increase workers’ vulnerability to forced labour.32-34 In Malaysia, 28% of 
501 electronics workers were found to be in situations of forced labour, and more 
than 80% reported paying excessive recruitment fees. In Guatemala, Verité found 
that withholding wages and meals was a common punitive practice to ensure that 
production quotas were met for farmworkers in the sugar sector. Other research 
has found similarly punitive practices in use elsewhere, such as Ben Richardson’s 
work in the sugar cane fields of Brazil,35 and has confirmed the importance of debt 
in keeping workers labouring under them.
Much research has also been done on debt bondage as it relates to health. Typically, 
health expenditure is a major burden in countries where health coverage is poor 
and/or not universally provided. To make matters worse, in rural areas where cash is 
scarce, credit can be exceptionally expensive. That combination often leads to debt 
bondage, because when a family member is in need of urgent medical attention the 
only option available is usually for another family member to take a loan against the 
collateral of their future labour power.36-37 
In short, poverty is not just about lacking money. It is an interlinking web of mutually 
reinforcing disadvantages, which interacts with the demands of the market society to 
shape people’s vulnerability to forced labour. The story does not stop there, however, 
as we have yet to answer the question of why some people are more likely to be in 
situations of poverty than others. Identity and discrimination play enormous roles in 
determining who comes out on top, and it is to these that we now turn.
SUPPLY
It is not uncommon for proponents of globalisation to view the in-
tegration of marginalised social groups into the global economy as 
a positive step towards poverty reduction. However, as we showed 
in chapter 4 with our discussion of adverse incorporation, it is possible for people to 
be incorporated into the labour market, and still remain vulnerable to chronic poverty 
and exploitative labour relations. 
Discrimination on the basis of race, gender, caste and other factors shapes how 
people are treated in the labour market, and helps to create and justify the supply 
of people vulnerable to forced labour in the global economy. The “social categori-
sations”1 at the root of these various forms of discrimination are not ‘natural’, nor 
are they new phenomena; they are rooted in the very same logics that justified Eu-
ropean colonialism, the transatlantic slave trade, and other non-European systems 
of domination.2 
5Identity and discrimination
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According to the International Labour Organisation (ILO), the incidence of forced 
labour is particularly high among ‘scheduled’ castes and tribes in India, indigenous 
minorities in Nepal and non-Muslims in Pakistan. In Africa, forced labour relations 
are particularly prevalent in countries that experienced slavery, or where continuing 
patterns of discrimination against people of slave descent are present. And in Latin 
America, the majority of forced labourers are indigenous people.3-4 
The fact that these particular groups are most likely to be found in situations of 
forced labour suggests that the social discrimination leading to poverty and adverse 
incorporation is intimately bound up with legacies of hierarchy, domination and 
exclusion. At the same time, it is important to note that the dynamics fostering the 
exploitation of marginalised communities are not mere remnants from the past: 
they are actively reproduced and maintained by the global political economy.
This chapter looks at how the neoliberal restructuring of global markets has exac-
erbated social hierarchies and shaped long-lasting patterns of exploitation into a 
continual supply of people vulnerable to forced labour. 
Poverty and social discrimination
While some remain deeply invested in the idea that forced labour has nothing to 
do with structural inequalities, or that in this context race and gender matter lit-
tle,5 there is an abundance of research that demonstrates that poverty and labour 
exploitation disproportionately impact women, lower castes, and non-white and 
indigenous people.6-8 And to the extent that they can be relied upon, statistical esti-
mates constantly reveal more women than men in forced labour and locate consid-
erably more forced labourers in Africa and Asia than in Europe or North America.9 
As discussed in chapter 1, the restructuring of global markets has heightened the 
demand for exploitable, ‘disposable’, and flexible labour.10-11 For this reason, global 
and domestic labour markets have become increasingly reliant on mechanisms that 
deepen unfreedom and labour insecurity for large segments of the working poor.12 
Within this dynamic, social discrimination serves as an “inequality-generating 
mechanism”13 that facilitates the wider patterns of poverty and inequality in which 
GVCs are rooted.14 Why? Because if certain people are considered to be lesser than 
others, they are more likely to face the poverty that facilitates their exploitation, and 
to be viewed by society and employers as more justifiably exploitable. 
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For instance, gender inequality has been documented as a driver for export com-
petitiveness, because the segregation of jobs by gender tends to keep women’s wages 
artificially low.15 This is what economist Stephanie Seguino calls the “comparative 
advantage of gender disadvantage”.16-17 It is important to note, however, that these 
dynamics are also present in cases where women and men do the same work. For 
example, Alessandra Mezzadri’s research into transnational garment production 
shows that women are consistently valued less than their male counterparts and live 
subject to both covert and overt forms of coercion and exploitation that their male 
co-workers are spared. Most are paid less than men even when performing the same 
tasks, and many have been the targets of gendered verbal or physical discipline on 
the shop floor.18-19
This is compounded by other types of 
gender-intensified constraints, such as 
women’s asymmetric role in reproduc-
tive labour and the barriers they face in 
accessing resources such as land, credit 
and education.20 All these constraints 
combined can make it much more dif-
ficult for women to socially upgrade in 
GVCs than men.21,22 
Intersecting disadvantages
Gender disadvantages often intersect 
with other forms of disadvantage, 
including those based on race. Cruz 
Caridad Bueno has conducted re-
search with low income black women 
working in export processing zones (EPZs) and as domestic workers in the Domini-
can Republic. Her conclusion is that they contribute to wealth and capital formation 
for the homes and businesses that employ them, “but are limited in their ability 
to accumulate wealth and human capital for themselves, because employers take 
advantage of racial, gender, and class discrimination to devalue their work contri-
butions”.23 In simple terms, employers find them suitable only for certain low-status 
and low-pay jobs to which they are then effectively confined. Employers furthermore 
take advantage of their prior exclusion from rights-based education and resulting 
legal illiteracy to extract extra-legal labour from them. And, finally, employers rely 
If certain people are considered 
to be lesser than others, they 
are more likely to face the 
poverty that facilitates their 
exploitation, and to be viewed 
by society and employers as 
more justifiably exploitable.
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on the fact that most poor people with family responsibilities are rarely able to say 
no to a job.
Of course, discrimination based on race or other factors impacts people of other 
genders as well. In Brazil, for example, Nicola Phillips found that the overwhelm-
ing majority of workers identified as working in “conditions analogous to slavery” 
on sugar plantations supplying the world market came “overwhelmingly from the 
poorer regions of the country, with corresponding racial characteristics”.24 Sugar 
production is extremely demanding and turns a profit by relying on hard physical 
labour, yet employers do not look for just anyone willing to perform that labour. Re-
search shows that they specifically seek out dark-skinned young males, since their 
gender and racial characteristics are said to make them especially well adapted to 
the work.25
Verité’s in-depth research into Peru’s and Ecuador’s labour markets tells similar sto-
ries of discrimination-based vulnerabilities. In Peru’s illegal gold mining industry, 
indigenous Peruvians from remote areas were found to be the group most vulnerable 
to forced labour and debt bondage. Known as indocumentados, they have no birth 
certificates verifying their nationality and thus cannot acquire the national identi-
fication documents necessary to access jobs in the formal sector. This pushes them 
into informal sectors such as the mining industry, where they lack the resources 
and ability to report labour violations, and many end up trapped in dangerous and 
exploitative conditions.26
In Ecuador, Verité found that women, indigenous people and people from African 
descent working in the palm industry are substantially more vulnerable to labour 
exploitation than other groups.27 Many Afro-Colombians and indigenous people 
immigrate to Ecuador from Colombia precisely because they are unable to secure 
decent jobs in their home country, only to be subjected to similar forms of dis-
crimination in Ecuador. Their irregular migration status further exacerbates their 
race-derived vulnerability in the new country, a topic we will delve into more fully 
in chapter 9.  
Indigenous people frequently face restricted options for more reasons than a lack 
of documentation. In addition to being subjected to chronic poverty,28 indigenous 
people are usually deprived of land and other resources, which makes them espe-
cially vulnerable to exploitative labour conditions. We also see such dynamics at 
work with caste.29 Recent research by Alpa Shah and Jens Lerche has confirmed that 
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it is more difficult for members of lower castes and indigenous peoples in South 
Asia to exit situations of extreme poverty and to benefit from increases in income.30
Nicola Phillips’ research into garment production in Delhi corroborates the find-
ings of these other researchers. In a survey of 220 households employing children to 
produce garments, she found that 60% come from the very lowest castes.31 Research 
conducted by the Centre for Research on Multinational Corporations (SOMO) and 
the India Committee of the Netherlands (ICN) led to similar findings: 60% of the 
workers they interviewed in the spinning units of five textile enterprises in Tamil 
Nadu – a major production hub in the global garment sector – came from what are 
known as ‘scheduled castes’ or other backward castes. And this type of caste-based 
discrimination is also prevalent in tea plantations, brick kilns and mining quarries, 
to name a few other industries.32-34
Deep structures  
The many examples above illustrate that even if the lines dividing us were initially 
drawn by elites bent on entrenching their domination, they have now evolved into 
living systems that are constantly maintained and reproduced in the localised forms 
of discrimination, coercion, and exploitation that comprise forced labour at the foot 
of the global economy. Discrimination on the basis of gender, race, caste and ethnic-
ity, among other socially-constructed markers, shapes vulnerability to exploitative 
labour relations and socially sanctions both exploitation and disadvantage.35 It also 
prevents people who find themselves in such situations from accumulating the nec-
essary wealth and resources to exit situations of chronic poverty or debt bondage. 
Such systems “entrench a particular set of power relations in a given society”, con-
tribute to the exclusion of certain groups from access to wealth, and “give rise to and 
structure patterns of poverty and marginalisation”.36 
SUPPLY
In 2013, the Bangladeshi garment industry made headlines after 
the Rana Plaza factory building collapsed, killing more than 1000 
people and injuring more than 1000 others.1 A year later, ram-
pant use of forced labour was documented in Thailand’s shrimp industry, a major 
supplier to the world’s largest retailers.2 And in 2017, shoppers at a Zara retail store 
in Istanbul found messages sewn into clothing claiming garment workers were not 
being paid. It was later discovered that Inditex, Zara’s parent company, had refused 
to pay 155 labourers after one of its factories unexpectedly shut down in 2016.3 
These high-profile cases are just a taste of the widespread and well-documented in-
stances of labour abuse occurring across various countries and sectors in today’s glob-
al economy.4-6 All involved workers who were left unprotected in part because they 
were in non-standard forms of work: temporary work, part-time and on-call work, 
contract and agency work, and false self-employment. Non-standard work is usually 
associated with lower wages and fewer protections, as well as difficulty in accessing 
available protections. Non-standard workers are also disproportionately vulnerable 
6Limited labour protection
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to abuses such as wage theft and illegal wage deductions, mandatory overtime, and 
health and safety violations. As the International Labour Organisation (ILO) notes, 
non-standard forms of work have become “a prominent feature of labour markets in 
developing countries, and has grown in importance in industrialized countries. In 
Bangladesh and India, nearly two-thirds of wage employment is casual”.7 
The decline of ‘standard’ work and the labour protections that came with it has been a 
major component of globalisation. For all workers this has meant greater difficulty in 
accessing the protections that are in place, and for the ranks of non-standard workers, 
many of those protections are not available at all. Additionally, many governments 
have exempted certain sectors and areas (e.g. export processing zones) from labour 
laws and protections, such as those that govern minimum wage and overtime. 
This has created a context in which various grades of labour exploitation are able 
to thrive, including forced labour at the extreme end of the labour exploitation 
continuum.8 Indeed, a core factor driving forced labour is the interaction between 
workers’ individual vulnerability – which as we have shown, can be rooted in pov-
erty, adverse incorporation and intersecting forms of social discrimination – and a 
setting in which workers can be exploited without impunity.9 This chapter looks at 
how shifts in the labour protection landscape have contributed to workers’ vulnera-
bility to exploitation, including forced labour.   
From protection to precarity
Extensive research has documented the relationship between neoliberal market re-
structuring and the proliferation of unprotected, precarious form of work.10-15 The 
workers who are the most likely to suffer from labour abuses are those in low-paid, 
informal and unorganised jobs16-17 and in sectors that are heavily reliant on flexible, 
temporary workforces.18
The expansion of precarious work globally has coincided with the rise of global pro-
duction networks.19 While later chapters explore in much greater depth how these 
networks function, for the moment it suffices to say that precarious work is attractive 
for firms because it both reduces labour costs and absolves employers of responsibility 
for their employees. As such, precarious work has become extremely widespread. A 
2016 report by the International Trade Union Confederation (ITUC) analysed the 
global supply chains of 50 TNCs with a combined revenue of US$3.4 trillion, and 
found that only 6% of their global supply chain workforces were directly employed. Of 
the remaining 94%, large swathes were in non-standard employment.20
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Neoliberal reforms have also created spaces of legal exception where production 
takes place literally beyond the bounds of ‘mainland’ law, such as export processing 
zones (EPZs).21-22 EPZs are industrial havens offering investors tax breaks and labour 
law exemptions in an effort to attract their foreign capital. They have exploded over 
recent decades, increasing from 80 to over 3000 between 1975 and 2000.23 They now 
play a major role in many global supply chains. Research from a range of contexts 
shows that labour standards within them are frequently poor, and workers caught 
within them frequently face forced overtime, dangerous conditions, and widespread 
gender or racial discrimination.24-26 
Living with insecurity
These shifts have had dire consequences for workers. Alongside declining real 
wages, many now-informal workers face increased exploitation, and a greater need 
to accept difficult, dangerous and dirty work for want of superior alternatives.27-29 
Informality has made them unprotected. A good example of this is the garment in-
dustry, where the proliferation of outsourcing labour from the factory to the home 
has excluded home-based workers from certain labour protections, while also cre-
ating barriers to organising.30-31 The expansion of informalisation, temporariness 
and flexibility has also led to increased insecurity for workers,32 as it makes planning 
for the future and bargaining to improve work conditions more difficult. Starting 
workers on temporary contracts is a powerful way to keep them there, as it enables 
employers to quickly jettison any workers attempting to organise.33
The widespread incidence of wage-related rights abuses has been widely document-
ed. One report by the Asia Floor Wage Alliance found that 73% of contract workers 
and 50% of permanent workers across 36 seafood processing plants in southern 
Bangladesh reported receiving less than the nationally set minimum wage. In many 
sectors, including garment production, agriculture, and food processing, a shift 
from hourly wages to a piece-rate system has also deepened workers’ income in-
security.34-36 Too often, piece-rate salaries received by workers do not amount to 
the minimum or living wage.37 And in many cases, already low wages are further 
reduced by deductions for food and housing,38-39 and wage theft practices – such as 
late payments, non-payments, or denial of legally stipulated overtime rates.40  
In addition to wage-related rights abuses, workers are also vulnerable to coercive 
practices that could make them vulnerable to forced labour. In the US seafood 
processing industry, for example, a shift from unionised workers to immigrant 
labour provided by temporary work agencies has given employers greater ability 
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to implement low wages and substandard work conditions while evading liability. 
A report by the National Guestworker Alliance found that many of these workers 
faced immigration-related coercion (such as threats to call police or immigration), 
the inability to change employers, and threats of blacklisting, physical harm and 
sexual abuse.41 
The Asia Floor Wage Alliance has also found that workers producing garments for 
Walmart in supplier factories in Bangladesh, Cambodia, India and Indonesia face 
threats of termination for refusing to work overtime or for exercising their right to 
freedom of association.42 In many cases, gender-based violence or threats of vio-
lence can have similar impacts in terms of disciplining workers, as documented in 
Bolivia’s cattle and Brazil-nut sectors,43 Bangladesh’s shrimp industry,44 Ecuador’s 
cut flower industry,45 and Guatemala’s palm oil sector,46 just to name a few. These 
forms of gender-based violence in the workplace make it particularly difficult for 
women workers to bargain collectively and to advocate for better work conditions.47
The decline of collective action
The history of labour relations shows unquestionably that worker power lies in 
numbers, with union strength consistently correlated with better working condi-
tions, greater respect for existing labour laws, and greater likelihood of worker re-
dress in the case of abuse.48-49 We know, for example, that in industries with strong 
trade union representation, there are reduced rates of forced labour and other forms 
of exploitation.50-52
We also know that where workers do not enjoy the right or ability to collectively 
organise and defend their rights, they are more likely to experience individual and 
collective forms of exploitation. Yet, governments all over the world have placed 
limits on union activity. These have ranged from denying the right of collective or-
ganisation to specific sub-sets of workers (such as migrants), removing the require-
ment for firms to bargain collectively, raising the number of members necessary to 
form a union, setting mandatory participation rates in strike ballots and physically 
preventing union formation.53-54
Union membership is thus everywhere down.55 In the United States, for example, 
the rate of union membership was 10.7% in 2016, almost half the 20.1% it was in 
1983.56 The ILO’s recent study of bargaining coverage in 48 countries found an aver-
age drop of 4.6% between 2008 and 2013, while the average decline in union density 
over the same period and for the same group of countries was 2.3%.57 
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Absent state efforts to ensure workers’ rights to form unions and organise, it is more 
difficult for workers to advocate for better work conditions or to report cases of 
labour exploitation or forced labour. 
Lack of enforcement
While gaps in both international and domestic labour laws certainly exist, most 
labour violations occur when existing laws to protect workers are not enforced. An 
acute example is minimum wage. Despite being addressed in most countries’ nation-
al laws as well as in international law, minimum wage requirements are continually 
and consistently violated all along the supply chain. So too are safety regulations, so 
too are holiday and overtime pay requirements.58 
Part of the problem is that labour inspectorates face chronic personnel and fund-
ing shortages almost everywhere.59 Overstretched government agents are unable to 
keep up with even formal enterprises, let alone the vast informal economy where 
forced labour concentrates.60 This is of great significance because research shows 
that labour compliance is more likely where inspections are more frequent.61
Instead, severely strained labour enforcement authorities have looked for any way they 
can to reduce their burden. One solution governments have hit upon is self-regulation 
by the private sector. Business has promoted this idea as well, lobbying for the power, 
legitimacy, and discretion to create and enforce their own rules.62 Their success has 
given them freedom from oversight whilst also allowing them to market themselves 
as ‘socially responsible’. These private corporate social responsibility initiatives have 
well-documented flaws, which we will explore in detail in chapter 11.63-66
These dynamics are highly damaging for global labour. At the macro level, they 
are reflected in rising inequality, stagnant or declining real wages, and in capital’s 
capture of an ever-increasing share of global value relative to labour.67-68 At the 
micro-level they contribute directly to pushing workers into vulnerable ‘zones of 
exception’ beyond the reach of protection, by fostering climates where labour ex-
ploitation and forced labour can thrive. In 2015, the ITUC found that almost half 
of the 141 countries they examined had “systematic violations” or “no guarantee” of 
labour rights.69 This is not a coincidence. The freedom from forced labour depends 
on the capability of accessing external protection, and under the circumstances doc-
umented above far too many are unable to do so.
SUPPLY
The rules governing people’s mobility within the global economy 
are not neutral sorting mechanisms but tools producing different 
categories of people able to enjoy different rights and freedoms.1 
To be on the right side of them is to be able to move away from poverty, unem-
ployment, and labour abuses towards better work conditions, labour protections 
and public safety nets. To be on the wrong side of them is to substantially lose one’s 
freedom to say no to exploitative labour conditions. This is starkly reflected in the 
existing data on the link between migrant status and forced labour.2-5 As Nandita 
Sharma puts it, “immigration policies [are] the vehicle through which [migrants’] 
unfreedom is organized”.6 This chapter will examine how such policies operate in 
the contemporary global economy to shape people’s vulnerability to exploitative 
labour conditions amounting to forced labour.  
Border controls 
Migrant vulnerability to forced labour begins at the border. Although political 
authorities routinely claim that tighter borders protect would-be migrants from 
7Restrictive mobility regimes
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‘trafficking’, in reality borders increase the likelihood of migrants ending up in situ-
ations of exploitation.7-9 Aggressive border policies create a game of cat and mouse, 
where those committed to moving must take evermore circuitous, dangerous and 
illegalised paths to achieve their objectives. Success therefore comes with a price, 
one which is frequently paid to smugglers and other intermediaries by taking on 
debt. To repay these debts many migrants agree to debt-bonded forms of work in 
hyper-exploitative conditions.10-11 
Yet even people who arrive in a country legally can be placed at risk by restrictive 
migration regimes. Certain categories of migrants – such as asylum seekers – are 
denied access to the labour market or to social protections while they wait for a 
decision on their status. In the United 
Kingdom, the 2002 Asylum Act with-
drew the right to work from asylum 
seekers as a means of deterring exces-
sive or ‘bogus’ applications, while later 
legislation limited the extent to which 
they can call on the state when in 
need.12-14 These changes have thrown 
many into destitution, forcing them 
to make do with limited state support 
or enter the informal economy. When 
they opt for the latter illegal and ex-
ploitative conditions often await.15-17
Systemic vulnerability 
Myriad studies have documented the 
links between migration status and 
vulnerability to forced labour.18-20 In the UK, researchers have shown this in low-
skilled or illegal sectors such as agriculture, construction and cannabis production.21 
Similar results have been found in Italy’s agricultural sector, where tomatoes, oranges, 
and other produce are predominantly harvested by African migrants caught between 
needing to earn a living and being entitled to absolutely no state support.22-28
Irene Peano has been conducting research with these workers for several years and 
observes that most “earn on average less than half the minimum wage established 
by collective agreements”. Worse still, “many work for a piece rate rather than an 
hourly wage, and in most cases do so entirely outside the social security system. 
Aggressive border policies create 
a game of cat and mouse, where 
those committed to moving 
must take evermore circuitous, 
dangerous and illegalised paths 
to achieve their objectives. Success 
therefore comes with a price.
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Working hours greatly exceed those prescribed, and illegal gangmasters, frequently 
employed to recruit and discipline the labour force, charge workers for transport to 
the fields as well as accommodation”.29-30
Although most of these workers do consent to their conditions, their freedom to 
do otherwise has been radically curtailed by their extra-legal status. This status pre-
vents them from accessing state support and places high constraints on their ability 
to secure the means of their own reproduction.31 This disadvantage is exacerbated 
by racial discrimination and other aspects of agricultural production (such as the 
low prices demanded by large buyers) to produce their exploitation. They represent 
a disposable labour force available when employers need them, yet those same em-
ployers have no responsibility for their welfare when they don’t.
Such dynamics also exist in countries across the global south. In India and China, 
for example, governments have placed restrictions on the rights and entitlements of 
migrants when they move internally from state to state. As a consequence, millions 
of migrants effectively exit social protection when they leave their home states. Re-
searchers at Oxford University surveyed 7000 households in the Indian province of 
Bihar, whose members usually migrate seasonally for work. They found that 30% 
were unable to access their entitlements to subsidised food when they did so be-
cause their ration cards were declared invalid at their destinations. Such limitations 
significantly increase the likelihood of people ending up in situations of abuse, since 
they have no safety net in times of hardship and must rely on employers or labour 
contractors for food, board and social support.32
Apart from geographic region, certain sectors are often especially vulnerable to 
forced labour because states place them outside the purview of labour law while 
migrants are intentionally recruited into them. A study by the Organisation for 
Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), for example, found that farm work 
across the Global North is “exempt from requirements concerning overtime, rest 
days, and health and safety standards”, as well as free from labour inspection.33 In 
many instances, therefore, the only force available to ensure employers comply with 
existing labour standards are the employers themselves.34 This, as the International 
Labour Organisations’s (ILO) recent Economics of Forced Labour report highlights, 
carries significant risks for agricultural migrant worker safety.35
Worse still, certain governments place limits on the rights of migrants to collective-
ly organise in defence of their interests. The same OSCE study found restrictions 
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commonly applied to migrants’ rights to participate in trade unions or to form their 
own unions. These include “making citizenship a condition for taking a trade union 
office, stipulating that a proportion of the membership must be nationals, or linking 
trade union membership to a condition of residence or reciprocity or both”.36 
Visa programmes 
Temporary or ‘tied’ visa programmes are another important mechanism fostering 
forced labour among migrants and restricting their ability to exert their rights. Such 
visa programmes allow migrants to enter a country but only to work for one specific 
employer or in one specific location. They commonly apply to sectors which already 
entail significant worker vulnerabilities because of their geographical or social isola-
tion, such as agriculture, domestic work or care work.37-38 For example, workers on 
visas such as the H2 Guestworker Programme in the United States or the Overseas 
Domestic Worker visa in the UK are not permitted to change employer or to seek 
alternative employment if and when problems with their current employers arise. If 
for any reason they choose to leave their current employment relationship, they are 
subject to deportation.39-42 
The Kafala system, a visa sponsorship programme in Gulf countries, has also been 
documented to foster exploitative labour conditions. Migrant workers to countries 
like Bahrain, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates experience what the Sarah Leah 
Whitson, the executive director for the Middle East and North Africa Division of 
Human Rights Watch, calls a “triangle of oppression”, the three sides of which are: 
heavy fees to labour brokers to secure a job, the confiscation of their passports by 
employers as soon as they arrive in their destination country, and the absence of 
legal protections and recourses if they face abuse.43 
Tied visa programmes inevitably create spaces of structural vulnerability.44 Many of 
the workers on them are relatively poor, with family dependents back in their home 
countries relying on their wages for school, healthcare or other necessities. Many 
will also have indebted themselves heavily to fund their travel and the purchase 
of their visa. They thus face very high opportunity costs if they attempt to leave 
their employment, even when that has become abusive or exploitative. And in many 
cases, employers capitalise on these vulnerabilities and use threats of denunciation 
as a mechanism for bolstering productivity or preventing migrant workers from 
organising.45 As a result, although they may be formally ‘free’, the substance of their 
freedom is severely curtailed by their lack of any meaningful freedom to exit this 
labour relation. 
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Conclusion
We know that labour regulation, enforcement and organising are crucial for pre-
venting the exploitation of workers. Yet migrants frequently have no choice but to 
work outside the reach of regulation and without the benefit of collective action 
due to the limitations that states place on their freedom. Thus while the prophets of 
‘globalisation’ hold that markets bring liberty with them, in reality its distribution 
is far from even.
Capital roams the earth freely but labour most certainly does not. Excluded from 
wealth or adversely incorporated into the processes that generate it, many of the 
world’s poor are denied their freedom to say no when – and especially when – they 
choose to leave their homes in order to make more money elsewhere. Their contin-
ued exclusion is a result of immigration policies and consequently they live at a real 
risk of forced labour. This risk is compounded by processes of social discrimination, 
by the neoliberalising undercutting of labour protection, and by the creation of mi-
gratory regimes that entrench vulnerability. This is what it means to create a ‘supply’ 
of potential forced labourers. It is to the demand for their labour that we now turn.
DEMAND
The political economic forces creating a business ‘demand’ for 
forced labour are no more random than those creating a supply of 
people vulnerable to it. Instances of forced labour are not – we re-
peat, not – the simple outcome of immorality among criminals or ‘bad apple’ employers. 
Although often characterised as a hidden crime occurring randomly on the “under-
side of globalisation”,1-2 in reality, forced labour is a stable and predictable feature of 
many global supply chains. Just as we can understand the factors that make people 
vulnerable to forced labour, so too can we trace the dynamics that underpin the 
business demand for their labour. This section of the report draws together research 
from across several sectors and regions to illustrate four key political economic driv-
ers of the demand for forced labour in supply chains. We begin with the increasingly 
concentrated corporate power and ownership.
8Concentrated corporate power and ownership
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Corporate scale and profits
One of globalisation’s most striking features has been the massive growth of multina-
tional corporations (MNCs). As we explained in chapter 3, many of these companies 
do not own or operate their own factories, but rather have redrawn global production 
patterns to coordinate the making of the goods they sell across thousands of supplier 
factories located around the world. Walmart, for instance, coordinates across over 
100,000 suppliers.
The model of fast, high-turnover production that Walmart, H&M and others have 
pioneered since the late 1990s has brought vast profits for the lead firms at the helm. 
In 2017, Apple brought in over US$45 billion in profits,3 Disney brought in US$9.39 
billion, and Nestlé’s profits hit US$8.65 billion.4 Walmart brought in US$481.3 billion 
in net sales that same year, nearly 35 times the GDP of a small country like Jamaica.5
These profits have been a driving force behind contemporary global inequality. The 
2017 list of the world’s richest people is topped by Amazon founder Jeff Bezos (net 
worth US$90.6 billion), Microsoft founder Bill Gates (net worth US$90 billion), and 
Amancio Ortega (net worth US$83.2 billion), founder of Inditex fashion group, which 
owns Zara. According to Oxfam, just eight men now control the same amount of 
wealth as the poorest half of the planet.6-7 The global workforces working directly and 
indirectly for these men and their companies largely come from this poor second half, 
and – as the ‘supply’ section of this report makes clear – it is an understatement to say 
that they have not benefited nearly as much as these men at the top. 
Monopolisation and market power 
In addition to making their founders and executives very wealthy, the size and scale of 
today’s MNCs gives them enormous market power, which is critical for understand-
ing forced labour. Swiss food giant Nestlé buys 10% of the world’s cocoa crop, 10% 
of the world’s coffee beans and 2% of the world’s milk and sugar.8 Companies have 
also become conglomerates encompassing hundreds of brands: Unilever alone owns 
over 400, including such major household names as Dove, Lipton, PG Tips, Vaseline, 
Ben & Jerry’s and Becel. The breadth of competition in many markets has lessened 
as a result, and often just a handful of companies hold virtual monopolies over entire 
markets. For instance, roughly 80% of the global tea market is held by just three com-
panies – the Dutch-British Unilever, the Indian Tata Group and Associated British 
Foods.9 Corporations’ vast market power allows them to dictate prices and margins in 
global value chains (GVCs). Unsurprisingly, they do so in ways that allow them to ac-
crue huge profits while squeezing ever-lower margins down along their supply chains.
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Examples abound. Four years ago, the major Canadian current affairs magazine 
Maclean’s investigated the cost breakdown of a C$14 polo shirt, reporting that it 
cost retailers only C$5.67 to produce, and of that, only C$0.12 went to workers.10 
In cocoa, we know from research conducted by scholars at the Institute of Develop-
ment Studies that cocoa farmers in Ghana receive “just 4 per cent of the final price 
of an average UK bar of milk chocolate”, with the lion’s share of the retail price going 
to chocolate manufacturers and retailers.11 Similarly, a study of value distribution 
in the production of Apple’s iPhone reveals that the majority of the money – 58.5% 
– goes straight to Apple’s profits, while Apple’s suppliers receive a far lower propor-
tion; Taiwan’s profits are 0.5%, while South Korea’s are 4.7%. In all, only 5.3% of the 
value of an iPhone goes into the pockets of Apple’s global workforce.12
Stephen Roach, an economist at Morgan Stanley, has called this model of MNC 
profitability “global labour arbitrage”, referring to the enormous profits that MNCs 
accrue through their systemic, near monopolistic control over the global labour mar-
ket.13-14 Their sourcing practices rely on, reinforce and seek to profit from countries’ 
‘comparative advantages’ in terms of labour exploitation. In the garment industry 
– as in agriculture and other industries with fierce competition over prices – firms 
like H&M decide where to source and manufacture goods primarily based on the 
cost of labour, and as such they ‘comparison shop’ for places where labour remains 
cheap (and by extension under-protected). It is no coincidence that, according to 
H&M’s supplier list,15 the company primarily turns to countries with notoriously 
low-wage garment sectors, like Bangladesh, China, Vietnam and Thailand, to find 
this optimal combination. 
Because of their size and market power, the prices MNCs choose to pay their first-tier 
suppliers have knock-on effects throughout the entire supply chain. They affect not 
only the margins of all downstream firms, as the following section explores, but also 
the overall labour conditions of producing countries. For instance, the world’s second 
largest clothing retailer, H&M, sources from “some 1,900 [first-tier] factories in which 
about 820 suppliers … employ about 1.6 million people”.16 Beneath these factories 
lies a web of smaller suppliers, conducting embroidery, printing, washing, spinning, 
knitting, weaving and dyeing, along with cotton growing, trading, and ginning.
The price that H&M pays at the top shapes the working conditions of those below, 
since each subsequent tier of suppliers must struggle over the remaining slice(s) 
of the pie. As labour is usually a factory’s biggest cost – or at the very least its most 
negotiable cost – the most obvious option for remaining profitable is to further 
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squeeze workers in turn. As such, even if H&M does not consider cotton growers or 
weavers to be its direct business partners, the firm nevertheless structures the world 
in which they work. 
Companies like H&M are quick to disclaim responsibility for this squeezing effect and 
for the low share of value accruing to workers and firms deeper down in the supply 
chain. They even note on their website that “workers are employed by the supplier – 
and not by us. We neither set nor pay the factory workers’ wages and consequently, we 
cannot directly decide what they are paid”.17 Technically this is true. But by dictating 
value distribution along the supply chain MNCs give shape to the market structures 
within which all those beneath them must work. The squeeze brought about by vastly 
uneven value distributions has, by this point, often become so tight that it fuels de-
mand for forced labour amongst businesses further down the chain. 
Commercial pressures 
The concentration of corporate power and ownership in lead firms not only allows 
them to dictate value distribution along the chain but also the absolute size of the pie 
to be shared. In other words, lead firms’ market power gives suppliers little choice 
but to accept that the end retail price will remain low. In combination with unequal 
value chain distribution this inescapably reduces profit margins further along the 
chain, especially in industries where labour costs are a major expense of doing busi-
ness. These trends have resulted in huge downward pressure on working conditions.
Major brands have consistently sought to drive down commodity and shop prices 
in recent years, or to keep them there, and one way they have done this has been to 
demand ever lower prices from their suppliers. This is especially true of competitive 
industries where margins are often already very thin. Faced with little choice but to 
accept the new terms or be replaced, manufacturers have attempted to alleviate the 
pressure by lowering their labour costs – often the only cost that can be reduced 
without sacrificing quality. As one South African apple farm owner put it, “the only 
ham left in the sandwich is our labour costs. If they [the supermarkets] squeeze us, 
it’s the only place where we can squeeze”.18 
One of the starkest examples is the food and agriculture industry, in which an esti-
mated 1.3 billion people work.19-20 Over two decades of evidence make it clear that 
downward pressure on prices in this industry create corresponding pressures towards 
forced labour. Debt-bondage, underpayment of wages, and forced overtime have be-
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come endemic to the cane industry, where the price of sugar has been steadily falling,21 
while lower coffee prices correlate with the increased use of forced labour. 22-23
Research across a range of industries suggests that businesses in tiers below the 
top-tier firm have sought to lower labour costs in several ways. Allain et al. (2013)’s 
study of the business models of forced labour highlights three. First, they directly 
lower labour costs by not paying the promised wage, openly paying below the min-
imum wage, and providing substandard accommodation for workers. Second, they 
attempt to generate revenues from workers, such as by charging recruitment fees or 
by overcharging for accommodation and other services. Third, they re-outsource 
work further down the supply chain, or to agency workers through labour subcon-
tracting.24-26 All of these scenarios can introduce higher risks of forced labour, as 
well as patterns of informalisation.27 
Sometimes, suppliers respond to commercial pressures by introducing business 
models configured directly around forced labour, using practices like debt bond-
age, forced overtime, illegal wage deductions, and physical, psychological, or other 
forms of coercion in an attempt to further lower labour costs. Research on a number 
of products – including sugar, garments, seafood, and electronics – has linked the 
business demand for forced labour to pressure on costs and prices.28-33 Occasionally, 
this occurs within the factories that supply directly to MNCs. For instance, a bed 
supplier to UK department store John Lewis, Kozee Sleep, was recently convicted of 
exploiting a “slave workforce”.34 This is in some senses unsurprising since, according 
to one study of the UK garment industry, manufacturers often have “very low or 
even no profit margins”. In such a situation the business demand for extremely low-
cost labour is painfully clear.35 
Cases like Kozee Sleep, however, are relatively rare. Much more frequently we find 
that the businesses resorting to forced labour exist far from the public gaze and from 
consumer-facing operations. They are often unregistered or informal organisations 
with no official link to the brand. To understand how and why this occurs, we need 
to take a closer look at outsourcing, and the research that documents higher prev-
alence of forced labour amongst outsourced portions of supply chains. It is to this 
we move next.
DEMAND
Academic discussion regarding the business of forced labour 
generally focuses on the role and responsibility of large mul-
tinational corporations (MNCs). This makes sense insofar as 
MNCs are usually based in Western countries and wield vastly disproportionate 
power within global supply chains. However, the overwhelming focus on MNCs 
overshadows the aggregate importance of smaller subcontractors in shaping labour 
standards, particularly those that ‘need’ labour exploitation to remain profitable. 
For this reason, it is equally important for us to understand how the dynamics of 
outsourcing shape smaller businesses’ behaviour toward both their workers and 
other firms within the supply chain. 
In contrast to the academy, the media has made these smaller businesses the main 
culprits in its reporting on labour exploitation. When forced labour happens, it is 
typically said to occur in shadow or unregistered production centres several steps 
removed from MNCs and far below where any reasonable due diligence might 
reach.1 As if to confirm this, MNCs invariably express shock and disbelief when 
9Outsourcing
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such reports break. Yet it is no accident that these practices occur in portions of 
the supply chain where MNCs have limited formal presence. And, far from being 
‘hidden’ or impossible to map, a growing body of research now shows clear patterns 
regarding the types of businesses most likely to perpetrate forced labour, and the 
relative importance of forced labour to their business model depending on their 
sector, task, and location within MNC-dominated supply chains.2-6
Outsourcing is the crucial dynamic that allows labour exploitation to take place with-
out tarnishing the reputation or credibility of MNCs. It does this by fragmenting and 
deflecting responsibility for workers while making oversight and accountability for 
labour standards difficult. The situation becomes even more complicated, and thus 
opaque, when informal businesses or intermediaries such as labour brokers are pres-
ent. These dynamics fuel forced labour 
because the complexity and lack of 
traceability introduced by outsourcing 
make it easy for businesses to get away 
with abuses, and because the legal 
distance that outsourcing introduces 
between lead firms and their suppliers 
shields the former from reputational 
damage and legal liability. 
Outsourcing along product 
supply chains
From electronics to sporting goods, 
MNCs have outsourced lower-value 
added activities to third parties. Those suppliers often then further outsource parts 
of the production – say, the making of microchips, or intricate leatherwork on a 
football – to additional parties. Today, most product supply chains, meaning “the 
discrete stages that a product goes through to transform it from raw materials to 
a finished product”,7 involve several stages of production. The more layers of out-
sourcing there are, the harder it is to track the working conditions surrounding the 
creation of a product. 
A burgeoning body of academic research reveals that forced labour often occurs 
in heavily outsourced portions of product supply chains. To take but one example, 
Nicola Phillips’ major study of forced labour in Brazil shows higher levels of subcon-
tracting to be correlated with incidences of forced labour.8-10 It includes statistical 
The more layers of outsourcing 
there are, the harder it is to 
track the working conditions 
surrounding the creation of a 
product.
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analysis of data pertaining to “more than 21,000 workers released from conditions 
defined as ‘slave labour’ between 2003 and 2009”,11 as well as qualitative research 
conducted by Phillips and her team on value chains in Brazil. One key finding is 
that “the most severe forms of labour exploitation tend to occur in those parts of the 
production process that are associated with outsourcing practices”.12 Forced labour 
was found to be concentrated in “outsourced activities in such sectors as sugar cane, 
soybean, cotton or coal (and also in urban sectors such as garments), [which] are 
routinely associated with a higher incidence of ‘slave labour’”.13 
Evidence across a wide body of industries and locations confirms these links between 
outsourcing and forced labour. Recent studies of fishing,14-15 garments,16 electronics,17 
agriculture,18 and construction19 all point to the concentration of forced labour within 
subcontracted activities. Quantitative data, too, confirm that link. For instance, a 2013 
study of more than 10 years of data by the Supplier Ethical Data Exchange (Sedex) 
found that risk – including the risk of forced labour – is highest beyond tier one; 18% 
more incidents of non-compliance with labour standards in the second tier, and 27% 
more non-compliance in the third tier. It also found that non-compliance became 
more critical and severe in the deeper tiers of the supply chain.20
In short, data from a range of studies now show that outsourcing contributes sig-
nificantly to forced labour. Because outsourcing has fragmented responsibility for 
workers across several firms, and distanced the consumer-facing brands from bad 
practices, it has created the conditions under which forced and exploitative labour 
can be used, without damaging brand reputation. 
Outsourcing along labour supply chains
Outsourcing along the labour supply chain, a part of which is made of “often un-
regulated networks through which forced or trafficked workers may be recruited, 
transported, and supplied to business by third party agents”, is equally important 
for understanding forced labour in supply chains.21-22  As mentioned earlier, firms 
have deepened their reliance on workers provided by labour market intermediaries 
(agencies, ‘gangmasters’ or ‘recruiters’) as a part of the larger project of globali-
sation. Recruitment agencies help companies avoid the costs of sustaining large, 
permanent workforces by providing a “parallel workforce” of “highly flexible, casu-
alised workers to meet variable, just-in-time deadlines at low cost”.23-27 
Labour recruitment agencies also ‘outsource’ part of their work, so to speak, frequent-
ly working with other intermediaries who then work with others in turn. This can 
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produce long labour supply chains that frequently involves exploitation well before 
workers actually enter the factory gates. Apple recently acknowledged this when 
noting that “some of our suppliers work with third-party labour agencies to source 
workers from other countries. These agencies, in turn, may work through multiple 
sub-agencies: in the hiring country, the workers’ home country, and in some cases, 
all the way back to the workers’ home village”.28 Recognising that these practices fre-
quently create situations of “bonded servitude”, as the BBC put it, for factory workers 
long before they enter the workplace, Apple has outlawed this practice amongst its 
suppliers, mandating that they cover the cost of recruitment fees themselves.29 
A number of recent studies have found that forced labour is widespread amidst long 
and complex labour supply chains.30-33 While not all labour market intermediaries 
are exploitative, some use forced labour as a revenue-generating and cost-saving 
strategy. A string of recent studies suggests that forced labour is especially prevalent 
among those providing labour at or around minimum wage.34-37 Indicators of it in-
clude contract substitution, passport retention, restrictions on mobility, predatory 
recruitment fees, debt bondage, wage deductions and threats of penalty. 
In all this, informality and flexibility are key. As Allain et al. argue, “although serious 
levels of exploitation can be found among a range of such intermediaries, forced 
labour typically emerges where an intermediary is operating at some level of in-
formality, at least for some period of time. The more legitimate the intermediary, 
the less likelihood there is that they engage directly in forced labour”.38 A wealth of 
evidence pertaining to food and agricultural industries in many different regions 
of the world suggests a similar conclusion, namely that informal subcontracting 
among labour market intermediaries can introduce forced labour.39-42 
Why is this so? In the first case, it is often significantly easier to exploit agency or 
broker-provided workers than a supplier’s own employees, as they are not on the 
books of the company who holds the supply contract, and therefore are often over-
looked by labour standards, inspections and audits. Workers on the same job site 
may also have several different ‘employers’, making oversight and accountability for 
labour standards difficult. Furthermore, workers tend to be moved from worksite 
to worksite in relatively short periods of time, and therefore often evade any efforts 
that may be in place to ensure labour standards.
Second, long labour supply chains often exist in industries where price competition 
is fierce and the margins associated with some activities are very low, such as clean-
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ing services, construction or agriculture. In these industries, where there is intense 
pressure to keep labour costs low, there is both pressure towards informality and to 
over-work and under-pay informal, contracted workers. 
Distancing big brands from big human rights abuses 
Outsourcing fragments responsibility for labour standards and makes maintaining 
oversight as well as determining accountability very difficult. It fuels the demand for 
forced labour by making it easier for small businesses to get away with exploitation 
while shielding bigger businesses further up the supply chain from reputational 
damage or legal liability. This, in turn, makes it harder for workers, NGOs, unions, 
lawyers and consumers to hold consumer-facing businesses to account. None of this 
is accidental. MNCs and politically-aligned governments have been instrumental 
in the neoliberal shifts that have made outsourcing possible and that have limit-
ed the liability of MNCs operating from their jurisdictions. They have pushed for 
labour flexibility and driven down the prices paid to top-tier suppliers, taking an 
ever-greater share of value in the process. But the implications of their business 
practices for forced labour go well beyond outsourcing and profit hoarding, and it is 
to a number of especially nefarious others that we now turn. 
DEMAND
Forced labour is illegal in most jurisdictions and expressly pro-
hibited in most multinational corporation (MNC) contracts and supplier codes of 
conduct. It therefore carries risks for businesses who use it. For MNCs such risks are 
generally confined to reputational damage, but for supplier firms the consequences 
could include the loss of MNC contracts, the imposition of large fines, or even crim-
inal prosecution. So, when is forced labour ‘worth’ the risk?
Business Professor Andrew Crane has argued that a confluence of business con-
ditions and capabilities must come together to make forced labour a viable man-
agement practice.1 A growing body of evidence shows that one key factor shaping 
these conditions and capabilities, and in doing so triggering the business demand 
for labour exploitation, is irresponsible sourcing practices on the part of MNCs. 
Such practices include short-term contracts, extremely tight production windows, 
chronically delayed payments, and unfair or unreasonable payment terms. Because 
buyers wield disproportionate purchasing power and influence, suppliers often 
enter into commercial agreements that are difficult if not impossible to meet with-
10 Irresponsible sourcing practices
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out imposing harsh or unfair conditions on workers. Such conditions can include 
excessive and compulsory overtime, illegal wage deductions or delayed payment, 
punitively high quotas, physical abuse or discipline, constraints on freedom of 
movement, repression of freedom of association, sexual violence, and harassment 
and intimidation.
Sometimes suppliers resort directly to forced labour to meet their obligations.2-7 
Others open the door to forced labour later on by engaging in risky practices like 
unauthorised product and labour subcontracting.8 But regardless of whether the 
consequences are immediate or time-delayed, the forces unleashed by irresponsible 
sourcing practices almost invariably trigger a demand for labour exploitation some-
where along the supply chain.
Time pressures and unstable sourcing
Global production is widely reported to be speeding up. Companies are always 
striving to offer customers something ‘new’, and a consequence of this has been 
ever-smaller orders with ever-shorter turnaround times.9 These time pressures fuel 
labour exploitation across several sectors, from the production of high-end con-
sumer electronics and home goods to leather and footwear,10-13 but nowhere is the 
issue thrown into such stark relief as in ‘fast fashion’. Where it once took six months 
for runway styles to hit high street stores and catalogues were designed around the 
four seasons, we now see retailers with “up to 52 season cycles, with a new product 
line every week”.14 
The enormous strain this places on suppliers and workers is further exacerbated by 
price and quality pressures as well as smaller order sizes. A recent study of the gar-
ment sector for the United Nations Industrial Development Organisation (UNIDO) 
finds that, “without exception, clothing and textile researchers have been noting 
how [lead firms] are insisting on lower prices, better quality, shorter lead times, 
smaller minimum quantities and supplier acceptance of as much risk as possible”.15 
Forced labour in garment production is not new, and has been well-documented 
among the unregistered factories, home workers, and contract and agency workers 
working in many different national contexts.16-19 Yet as garment production has sped 
up we have seen new challenges emerge that have further increased its likelihood.
To meet their obligations suppliers frequently pressure workers to work overly long 
or consecutive shifts for below-minimum wages while fulfilling extremely high 
quotas.20-24 They may also seek out workforces (e.g. children, refugees, irregular 
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migrants) whose desperation, vulnerability and restricted mobility leave them with 
little choice but to accept illegal working conditions.25-29 As we saw in chapter 5, 
such populations also find it difficult to resist or escape psychological or physical 
coercion.30 Time pressures on tier-one suppliers, furthermore, are generally passed 
down to the sub-tiers of the supply chain.
As just one example, the garment suppliers in India’s Tamil Nadu region are so 
affected by this dynamic that the Sumangali system has now emerged, in which 
young women “live in company-controlled hostels with no freedom of movement 
so that they will be available to work on call, won’t seek work in other factories or 
mills and will be deterred from joining a union”.31 This need for instantaneous yet 
cheap labour power is a direct result of decreasing production windows, and it fuels 
the business demand for forced labour.
Research also suggests that the time-sensitive nature of some products, such as 
perishable foods or seasonable goods, leads to predictable yet temporary concen-
trations of forced labour.32-34 Products like strawberries or tomatoes have very short 
harvest windows, and at picking time suppliers need a large number of workers but 
only for a short period. Artificial Christmas wreaths or Valentine’s Day hearts are 
produced under similar constraints, and to cope factories frequently must expand 
their core workforces while keeping costs as low as possible in the process.
As we saw in the last chapter, this need is often met through either labour sub-
contracting35-36 or subcontracting work to smaller, less formalised production sites. 
These include unregistered factories, where exploitative labour practices are a core 
part of the business model,37 as well as informal and unregulated workers including 
home workers.38-39
Instability within MNC sourcing practices adds to the pressure on supplier firms 
to engage in forced labour. That instability takes many forms, including late-notice 
alteration to the size, content or timing of orders. A recent study of the ‘root causes’ 
of excessive overtime in Turkey’s garment industry, for example, found key issues to 
be delays in the supply chain outside the vendor’s control, the limited ability of sup-
pliers to adapt to fluctuating orders, sudden and large orders, the unpredictability of 
future orders, last minute style changes and short lead times.40
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Falling prices
Changing price points are also significant to the business demand for forced la-
bour. According to national consumer price indexes, the prices of key household 
goods like clothing and food have fallen dramatically since the 1980s in many coun-
tries.41-43 Pressure on prices stems, in part, from MNCs competing to sell goods 
to cash-strapped Western consumers, whose standard of living been hit hard by 
neoliberal restructuring. Indeed, The Guardian recently noted that “Britain is expe-
riencing a rapid decline in living standards with the biggest squeeze in workers’ pay 
since 2014”.44 Downward pressure on prices puts producers at a disadvantage be-
cause buyers are not willing to pay as much for goods. And at the same time, many 
producers face growing business costs because of everything from regulatory or 
legislative changes to increasing commodity prices.45 This dynamic is often referred 
to by economists as the ‘price-cost squeeze’.
MNCs use their disproportionate commercial power to maintain their own profit 
margins even as prices fall. They do this by passing costs onto already squeezed 
suppliers. These relentless and ever-worsening pressures around price and cost are 
a key driver of forced labour in the global economy. Mark Anner, a professor of la-
bour and employment relations at Penn State University, once illustrated this point 
in an interview using an anecdote from a factory he visited in El Salvador:
[The owner] explained that the statutory minimum wage had just gone up 
by 10%. So, I asked her, ‘What did you do about it’? And she said she called 
the lead firm that was providing her with her orders…and she told them 
that she was going have to adjust her prices to reflect the fact that she now 
had to pay a higher statutory minimum wage. This was important because 
we know that about 80% of her overheads were labour costs…The lead firm 
paused for a moment and said, ‘No, you don’t understand, that is the price 
point. There is only one question and that question is, “Can you make this 
order at this price point?” Because if you can’t, with one or two phone calls 
we can move this to Haiti’. ‘So, what happened then?’, I asked her. She said 
she got on the megaphone and basically told the workers that they had to 
work 10% faster.46
The naked market power at work here is not uncommon in global supply chains. Al-
though the lead firm was not responsible in this instance for altering the price point, 
it used its power to force its supplier to absorb the added cost of the recent shift in 
production costs. When shocks like this happen, suppliers use several cost-mini-
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misation and revenue-generating strategies to mitigate the effects, including forced 
labour. In this light, it is unsurprising that global data on forced labour indicates that 
it is most prevalent in the agricultural sector,47 where producers have been badly hit 
by rising costs of inputs (e.g. seeds and energy) and decreasing prices for their final 
goods (e.g. wool, sugar, beef, wheat).
MNCs further exercise their power by delaying payments to suppliers. Suppliers’ 
tight margins make it difficult to pay production costs up front and wait long pe-
riods to recoup those costs, yet this is exactly what retail buyers frequently com-
pel them to do. In the UK, Tesco has become infamous among farmers for this 
reason.48-49 Despite the colossal profits Tesco makes, farmers report the company 
disputes agreed payment plans, imposes penalties for crop deficiencies, and makes 
un-scheduled deductions for in-store promotions. Where farmers contest these 
changes, further delays to payments can result, with the consequence that farmers 
are unable to cover their own overheads and may be forced into debt or to transfer 
their costs onto the labourers working for them.
In short, the unwillingness of MNCs to budge on their own profits – even in the face 
of rising production costs and falling prices – is a key driver of the business demand 
for labour exploitation and forced labour.
Conclusion
Today, the risks of forced labour are well documented. High-tech programmes also 
exist to help companies measure and mitigate risks, and to prevent and address 
forced labour in their supply chains. Yet, they continue to use irresponsible sourcing 
practices that are established triggers of the business demand for forced labour.
As we will see in the next chapter, MNCs are investing considerable resources in 
ethical certification schemes and social auditing programmes to combat forced 
labour and trafficking in their supply chains. Yet such schemes generally fail to ad-
dress the root causes of problems, such as time and cost pressures, and some place 
even greater burden and punitive pressure on suppliers which can push problems 
deeper into the shadows of supply chains.
DEMAND
A final root cause underpinning the business demand for forced 
labour are the governance gaps that allow employers to perpetrate it with impunity. 
Although forced labour has long been formally banned, the laws designed to protect 
workers are spottily enforced and it is rare that government inspectors physically 
check to see whether or not businesses are selling goods made with forced labour. 
Indeed, in the United States, one recent study found that “an employer would have 
to operate for 1,000 years to have even a 1 percent chance of being audited by De-
partment of Labor inspectors”.1 
Where non-government monitoring systems also exist, they are generally ineffec-
tive when it comes to detecting and correcting forced labour. Most social auditing 
systems focus on first-tier suppliers’ core workforces, and thus neglect the portions 
of supply chains where vulnerable subcontractors work and the risks of forced la-
bour are highest. Furthermore, such private systems are riddled with conflicts of 
interest. When abuses are uncovered, they tend to be reported only to retailers who 
then have discretion over whether or not to act on them.2-8 
11 Governance gaps
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In this sense, businesses’ ‘freedom to exploit’ must be understood as running in 
parallel to workers’ lack of the freedom to say no. Klara Skrivankova of Anti-Slavery 
International captures this point well when she says that forced labour’s “underlying 
causes include a regulatory framework in which the use of forced labour makes 
‘business sense’ even if illegal, because the risks of discovery and prosecution are 
low, [in light of] weak enforcement of labour standards”.9
The governance gaps and enforcement issues surrounding labour standards in glob-
al supply chains have been studied extensively.10-14 There is also a smaller body of 
emerging research that specifically considers gaps surrounding forced labour.15-19 
Synthesising across this work, we suggest that there are at least three key governance 
gaps that have been strategically created around and within supply chains that facil-
itate the business of forced labour. These are:
1. the consistent under-enforcement of national and sub-national labour 
regulations;
2. weak global governance and national legislative approaches to ensuring 
labour standards in global supply chains, such as transparency legislation;
3. a governmental preference for self-regulation and corporate social re-
sponsibility (CSR) initiatives, which are too often not fit for purpose 
such as poor quality auditing and social certification programmes. 
At the outset of this report, we noted that globalisation has been characterised by de-
clines in the national enforcement of labour standards.20-26 In chapter 5, we showed 
how dangerously low levels of labour inspection create a pool of workers who are 
vulnerable to forced labour. Here, we show how poor enforcement of national and 
sub-national labour laws also contributes to businesses’ demand for forced labour.
Poor enforcement of labour standards
Across many countries, national and sub-national agencies tasked with enforcing 
labour standards have had their budgets and staff cut to the extent that they are no 
longer effective. This makes it unlikely that businesses will be caught committing 
labour violations. If they are, the consequences are rarely more than a minor incon-
venience; the penalty for violating the labour code in Bangladesh, for example, is a 
mere US$325.27 This creates a context in which businesses can safely include forced 
labour within their business model. 
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While unenforced labour standards are often considered to be a ‘developing coun-
try’ problem, they contribute to the thriving business of forced labour in developed 
countries as well. As Allain et al. (2013) demonstrated in their study of forced labour 
in the UK, “vulnerability to forced labour is not an inherent quality of the person 
subjected to it, but rather is rooted in structural vulnerabilities established within 
the UK economy. These result in denying effective protection for workers’ rights, 
particularly at the lower rungs of the labour market.” They found that this context 
creates an environment where it makes “business sense to use forced labour”, which 
they then demonstrated using the commercial cannabis, food and agricultural in-
dustries as examples. 
The under-enforcement of labour 
standards has become a popular strat-
egy for attracting and maintaining 
investment, or for preventing offshor-
ing, in the era of globalisation. It is 
part of an ongoing redesign of the la-
bour market and business regulation 
to maximise profitability.28 Conse-
quently, illegal business practices like 
forced labour have become stable and 
now constitute viable parts of many 
organisations’ business models. 
Weak global governance
As awareness of forced labour has 
grown over the past decade, a number 
of transnational regulatory initiatives have sought to incentivise corporate account-
ability and responsibility for labour standards in global supply chains. These in-
clude the 2011 United Nations Guiding Principles for Business and Human Rights,29 
ILO’s Protocol of 2014 to the Forced Labour Convention, 1930,30 and revised OECD 
Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises.31
In addition, the home governments of many transnational corporations (TNCs) 
– including the United States, UK and France –  have passed national legislation 
intended to strengthen global governance systems to combat forced labour. This 
has frequently taken the form of transparency or disclosure legislation. One study 
found that over 55 pieces of national disclosure legislation have been passed since 
One recent study found that “an 
employer would have to operate 
for 1,000 years to have even a 1 
percent chance of being audited 
by Department of Labor 
inspectors”1
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2009,32 and high profile examples include: the 2015 UK Modern Slavery Act, 2012 
California Transparency in Supply Chains Act, and France’s 2017 Corporate Duty 
of Vigilance Law. As the authors of the study describe, this type of legislation relies 
on the economic leverage of the private sector to shape and improve working con-
ditions and is anchored in the assumption that knowledge of corporate behaviour 
will shape consumers’ and investors’ purchasing decisions.33
Transparency legislation varies hugely in terms of its quality and stringency. As 
Genevieve LeBaron and Andreas Rümkorf note:
at one end are strong laws that mandate companies to develop a due dil-
igence plan on human rights in their supply chain, to disclose this plan 
and to implement it. At the other end are weak laws that merely provide 
statutory endorsement to existing voluntary CSR initiatives and reporting, 
with no penalty for non-compliance. Most recent legislation falls towards 
the weaker end of the spectrum.34 
The UK Modern Slavery Act, for instance, requires companies conducting business 
in the UK with an annual turnover of £36 million to report on any measures they 
have taken to prevent or address forced labour. But it does not require them to 
report whether those measures are actually effective, and does not include penalties 
for non-compliance. This leaves open the quixotic possibility of brazenly reporting 
that they are doing nothing. To date, the enforcement of transparency legislation 
has also been lacking.35-42  Only a fraction of companies covered under the UK leg-
islation have published reports, and many of those that have been published have 
fallen short of complying with the law.43-44 No companies have been prosecuted for 
non-compliance. As such, this legislation has upheld the status quo and done little 
to curb the root causes of business’ demand for forced labour.
Recent initiatives to address the business of forced labour within the global gover-
nance arena have been similarly ineffective. The ILO’s 2014 legally binding protocol 
on forced labour, for instance, does not include a provision on supply chains, while 
efforts to achieve a binding convention on decent work supply chain governance have 
yet to bear fruit.45-47 In short, research suggests that a key factor underlying the busi-
ness of forced labour is the failure of states to either enforce existing labour standards 
or to create new, modern, and effective global governance solutions to the problem.
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Weak social auditing and ethical certification regimes
Governments have sought to replace their own enforcement capacity by devolving 
sizeable power, authority and legitimacy to private companies to set and enforce 
their own labour standards.48-51 In this context, TNCs have created codes of conduct 
for suppliers, which they claim to ‘monitor’ and ‘enforce’ through social auditing. 
They also rely on social certification schemes like Fairtrade and Rainforest Alliance 
to independently verify production standards and communicate these to consumers. 
However, a growing body of research reveals that social audit and certification pro-
grammes are not effective tools to detect, report or correct forced labour.52,53 Some 
of their most crucial shortcomings include:
• Limited audit duration, resulting in a ‘snapshot’ of practices rather than 
long-term observation; 
• Weak audit methodologies with ample room for deception and cheating; 
• Financial conflicts of interest and commercial relations between audit 
firms and their clients; 
• Failure to encompass practices occurring beyond the factory gates, such 
as debt bondage to recruiters; 
• A focus on first-tier suppliers’ core workforces rather than the many 
layers of sub-contracting;
• Marginalisation of workers, who are most aware of how forced labours 
manifest on the ground, during the audit process.
Many social auditing programmes therefore give a blinkered view of who is in-
volved in production, missing out on vulnerable workers in heavily subcontracted 
and informal portions of supply chains.54-55 They give consumers, investors, and the 
public a false impression of labour standards within supply chains, and give rise to 
the perception that governance gaps surrounding forced labour in supply chains are 
being mitigated through voluntary CSR efforts. In reality, such systems do little to 
tackle the problems at hand.
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Briefly put, the inspection and auditing system for global supply chains does more to 
safeguard corporations’ reputations, operations, and profits than protect workers in 
both developed and developing countries.56 As LeBaron et al. have argued, “for nearly 
two decades, workers’ rights and trade union organizations, scholars, and auditors 
themselves have documented the flaws of the audit regime; yet, corporations have 
done little to transform it. The problem is not one of finessing the institutional design 
or audit methodology, but rather relates to corporate power, politics, and profits”.57 
Weaknesses in private supply chain monitoring systems render them ineffective 
tools for detecting and addressing forced labour. They are, along with weak enforce-
ment of labour standards and poor global governance frameworks, a key gover-
nance gap fuelling the business demand for forced labour. 
Conclusion
Existing research suggests that forced labour tends to happen in certain types of in-
dustries, activities, and portions of supply chains. It furthermore materialises in the 
face of specific business pressures, such as cost and time pressures and seasonality. 
Yet, these insights about the patterns of forced labour in supply chains have not been 
incorporated into the latest governance initiatives, which systematically under-pro-
tect workers by leaving open gaps in which exploitation can occur without redress. 
Adequate regulation and enforcement of labour standards within global supply chains 
would go a long way to eliminating the business demand for forced labour within 
those chains. And, as the next and final chapter of this report notes, where labour law 
is effectively enforced, and where businesses face consequences and penalties if they 
are caught using forced labour, it becomes a lot less viable as a business model. 
The key barriers to closing these governance gaps are not technical, but political. 
As Nicola Phillips and Fabiola Mieres note, they derive from “an unshaken ‘market 
fundamentalism’ and a reluctance significantly to challenge the private sector and 
powerful corporations”.58 It is time for that to change.
CONCLUSION
Globalisation’s promise was to pull people out of poverty by inte-
grating them into the world market and offering them decent work. It hasn’t deliv-
ered. Today, hundreds of millions of people are unemployed; more than 75% of the 
global workforce is on temporary or informal contracts; the ranks of the working 
poor are expanding daily; the provision of social and labour protection has been 
reduced; migrant rights are under threat; and exploitative as well as forced labour 
appear endemic in a number of industries. What is worse, many of the policy efforts 
aiming to address these problems don’t seem to be working. What, therefore, is to 
be done? In this, our concluding chapter, we point in a number of promising new 
directions and outline the kinds of actions that can be and have been taken, as well 
as suggest several avenues of research that could help strengthen the evidence base 
on exploitation in the global economy.
What do we know?
First, let’s review: this report has explored the structural root causes of forced labour 
in global supply chains. Our core message has been that those roots lie in systemic 
12Where do we go from here?
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features of the contemporary global political economy, and that forced labour can-
not be successfully tackled without changing these dynamics.
The mechanics and structures of the contemporary global economy create both 
a ‘supply’ of vulnerable workers and a business ‘demand’ for their labour. On the 
supply side, the key dynamics include poverty, social discrimination, limited labour 
protection, and restrictive mobility regimes. These, both on their own and in inter-
action with each other, create a global workforce vulnerable to exploitation. On the 
demand side, what matters most is the concentration of wealth and ownership, the 
business models structuring supply chains, major firms’ power to dictate the rules 
of global production, and the manifold governance gaps which make the business 
of exploitation not only viable but profitable.
These features of the world economy have not evolved spontaneously. Rather, they 
have been set in motion or catalysed by elite-led processes of neoliberal globali-
sation that have dramatically changed approaches to economic regulation. States 
have been fundamental to their institutionalisation, curtailing the structural and 
individual power of workers to say no and intensifying the structural and individual 
power of employers to compel them to accept dangerous, risky, and exploitative 
work. This means that the root causes of forced labour are fundamentally and in-
herently political.
It follows that states and political institutions must take responsibility and push 
towards genuine solutions. On the supply side, this means tackling distributional 
questions about poverty and inequality, creating and enforcing meaningful forms of 
labour and social protection, and responding humanely to the complex dynamics of 
migration. On the demand side, it means grappling with the dynamics of subcon-
tracting and outsourcing, including in long, complex and informal labour supply 
chains. It also means asking fundamental questions about the role and power of 
corporations in the twenty-first century.
What do we still need to learn?
Much is known about the political economy of forced labour, but even more re-
mains to be learned. We need detailed, in-depth and comparative research, with a 
special focus on causes as well as on the people, institutions and organisations that 
make the causes of forced labour possible. Below are a few of the key themes that are 
most urgent for scholars and activists to address.
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Political economic policy: It is clear that states produce the conditions needed for 
forced labour to remain part of many profitable business models, even as sitting gov-
ernments claim to champion anti-slavery causes. They do this through their political 
and economic policies relating to labour markets, to immigration and to the regulation 
of firms. Further research is needed to establish the links between political economic 
policy frameworks and the prevalence of forced labour and exploitation.
Corporate self-regulation: We know that allowing businesses to police themselves 
is not enough and we know that the non-enforcement of labour standards helps 
make forced labour a viable business model. However, further research is needed to 
understand when, why and how public and private governance of labour standards 
fall short, and to establish which alternative models of governance could address 
these failings.
Inequality: The widespread use of forced labour in the contemporary global econ-
omy is rarely linked to soaring inequality. Yet our research has led us to believe that 
the two trends are strongly connected. Although neoliberal discourses have effec-
tively divorced ‘poverty’ from ‘inequality’, arguing that only the former is a prob-
lem,1-2 the latest research on inequality3-6 and the social nature of power7-8 suggests 
that inequality is in fact causally related to poverty, with higher rates of inequality 
worsening deprivation. Further research is needed to understand how income and 
wealth inequality influence the prevalence of forced labour, as well as to explore 
forms of wealth redistribution that can successfully address it.
Beyond these big questions, it is also clear that we need focused research into spe-
cific supply chains. Scholars must map the length, breadth and depth of individual 
chains to parse out the distributions of profit and value between actors along the 
chain, as well as the labour practices linked to these patterns of distribution.
What is to be done?
Thankfully, although more work is needed, a wealth of struggles from all over the 
globe are pointing the way towards policies and actions able to push back against the 
root causes of forced labour. Although these neither form a cohesive global move-
ment nor work from a single overarching theory, they include promising initiatives 
that together form the pillars of an emerging framework for pushing beyond our 
current neoliberal impasse. Below, we explore a number of promising initiatives to 
address both the ‘supply’ and ‘demand’ factors that we have identified.
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Enforcement of labour standards and innovative, worker-led models: An im-
mediate and obvious starting point for better enforcement of labour standards is 
for states to reverse the labour reforms pushed through by neoliberalisation and to 
drastically increase both the size and mandate of their labour inspectorates. This 
will require altering budgetary priorities in favour of workers and their rights. Oth-
er promising strategies to bolster workplace standards and decrease exploitation 
include: the creation of penalties for businesses who violate labour standards, such 
as Brazil’s ‘dirty list’ for companies found to have used forced labour;9 targeted en-
forcement of labour standards in sectors and portions of the supply chain with the 
highest risks of exploitation;10 and the protection of collective action and the right 
to organise.11 Given the growing evidence that these new strategies are effective in 
reducing exploitative practices in supply chains, their potential to reduce forced 
labour should be investigated and bolstered further.
However, in recent years, as governmental monitoring and enforcement of la-
bour standards has decreased, workers’ organisations and advocacy groups have 
pioneered their own alternative strategies to protect workers from exploitation. 
These include innovative models of labour standards enforcement, such as formal-
ly including unions and workers’ centres as monitors. Found mainly in low-wage 
sectors in the United States,12-13 these models of “co-produced enforcement”14 have 
led to decreases in wage theft, unsafe working conditions, discrimination and gen-
der-based violence, and have facilitated the refunds of illegal wage deductions to 
workers.15 The Coalition of Immokalee Workers, a farmworker organisation based 
in Florida, has pioneered this type of worker-led labour standards enforcement16 
and underpinned it with a worker-drafted code of conduct agreed to by partner 
firms. Worker-driven social responsibility initiatives have been demonstrated to 
protect and improve conditions for vulnerable and low-wage workers. As such, they 
should replace traditional, industry-led corporate social responsibility (CSR) initia-
tives – the shortcomings of which have been well-documented – to address forced 
labour in supply chains.
Value re-distribution and living wages in global supply chains: Activists and 
workers’ organisations are putting forward a number of novel bargaining strategies 
to capture a greater share of the value they help to produce, and to achieve living 
wages in global supply chains. One example is the Asia Floor Wage Campaign,17 
a regional initiative to establish a living wage for garment workers across Asia by 
bargaining with big brands at the helm of clothing and apparel supply chains. By 
raising the wage floor for all workers within a regional sector, this type of initiative 
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could reduce the demand for forced labour in global supply chains since it ensures 
workers get a larger share of the pie.
Increased public goods provision and basic income: If being poor increases a 
person’s vulnerability to forced labour, then policies that reduce poverty will likely 
reduce the supply of people vulnerable to exploitation. In the age of neoliberalism, 
with public goods privatised and social protections rolled back, the obvious option 
is to reverse the neoliberal trend – pushing towards increased social protection, 
stronger safety nets, more extensive public goods provision, and greater redistribu-
tion of wealth.
One potential option for doing this is Unconditional Basic Income (UBI). UBI is 
defined as a regular payment given to all people without means test or work require-
ment. It seeks to give all people a solid material base, which could in turn provide 
them with the monetary security they need to walk away from forced labour. Al-
though it has long been theoretically attractive,18 it is now increasingly being tested 
empirically. UBI is currently being piloted in several locations around the world, and 
the recent results of a UNICEF trial in India are arresting.19 There, UBI led to an in-
crease in economic activity among the poor and generated improvements in health 
and welfare indicators ranging from nutrition to sanitation. Its effects also worked 
against traditional axes of discrimination, resulting in greater benefits for women 
and the poor than men and the wealthy. Most significantly, however, it engendered 
a clear decrease in debt bondage, as poor villagers were able either to pay off their 
debts or to accumulate sufficient cash reserves to avoid indebting themselves in the 
first place. Given these results, the potential of UBI to contribute to a decreased sup-
ply of vulnerable workers should be further explored, in particular with populations 
vulnerable to or currently experiencing exploitative or forced labour.
Yet cash alone may never be enough. For this reason, we must also explore modali-
ties for the provision of basic needs outside of market relations, such as cooperative 
natural resource management, land redistribution and legally enshrined guarantees 
of the means of subsistence to all.
Better immigration policies and the ‘employer pays’ principle: If punitive mo-
bility and border control regimes facilitate the use of forced labour, then it follows 
that policies to ensure safe passage and improve conditions and rules for migrant 
workers must play an important role in curtailing the supply of workers vulnerable 
to forced labour. Around the world, migrant workers and migrant rights organisa-
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tions are pushing for better policies and protections to address the exploitation and 
untimely death20 of migrant workers. They are pioneering strategies to protect and 
empower migrant workers from forced labour. One promising idea that features in 
many such strategies is the “employer pays principle”.21 This recognises that many 
migrant workers are made vulnerable by the recruitment and service fees they pay 
to obtain jobs, and seeks to alter that dynamic by shifting the financial burden of 
recruitment to the employers instead.
Efforts to address the vulnerabilities shaped by immigration policy must be closely 
intertwined with the robust labour standards enforcement systems described above. 
As Janice Fine and Gregory Lyon, both professors at Rutgers University, have argued, 
“preventing the exploitation of vulnerable low-wage immigrant workers requires 
integrating into immigration reform proposals significantly strengthened labour 
standards enforcement”.22 We must be careful though. While all of these strategies 
are promising methods of curtailing the immediate crisis of widespread worker 
vulnerability to forced labour, they do not fundamentally transform the power dy-
namics between employers and workers, nor do they disrupt the political economic 
processes – such as inequality, immiseration, privatisation or land enclosure – that 
shape the global political economy.
Better governance, including a binding global convention on labour standards 
in supply chains: Traditional, national, regulatory frameworks – particularly where 
they are poorly enforced – have proved insufficient for governing labour standards 
in global supply chains. Put less kindly, they frequently facilitate the use of forced 
labour by overseas suppliers in global supply chains, and obstruct efforts to hold 
multinational corporations (MNCs) accountable for the exploitation involved in 
the creation of their products.23 Stronger governance is needed to effectively curtail 
MNCs’ ability to legally distance themselves from the abuse and exploitation inher-
ent to their business models and triggered by their purchasing practices.
Activists have called for a binding global convention on labour standards in sup-
ply chains to close existing legal gaps and loopholes.24 Their demand is backed by 
mounting evidence that direct MNC accountability for working conditions in their 
global supply chains is effective in combatting exploitation. For instance, the Accord 
on Fire and Building Safety in Bangladesh,25 signed by major garment companies 
following the Rana Plaza collapse in 2013, has led to improved safety, stronger 
labour rights and reduced exploitation. Stronger governance – including through 
initiatives that establish legally binding accountability for lead firms for working 
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conditions along their entire supply chain – is a promising strategy to address the 
business demand for forced labour.
Joint employer and intermediary liability: The rise of labour market intermediar-
ies – including labour providers and contractors, labour agencies, and ‘gangmasters’ 
– means that today, a large number of workers are working under the supervision 
and management of companies who are not technically their employer. As this re-
port has documented, such workers often face challenges when seeking to organise, 
bargain or access labour protection, and in some contexts they are disproportion-
ately vulnerable to exploitation.
In the United States, a wave of recent court decisions across national and state juris-
dictions have confirmed that companies and labour market intermediaries can be 
‘joint employers’, in other words, that companies using temporary staffing agencies, 
labour providers, and other sub-contracting arrangements are not insulated from 
responsibility for those workers’ conditions. Trade unions and workers’ organisa-
tions are pushing for broad application of the joint liability principle26 in relation to 
global supply chains. The International Trade Union Confederation, for instance, 
has called for multinational brands to accept joint responsibility for working condi-
tions in their global supply chains, particularly around wages and health and safety.
Such campaigns are promising and deserving of support. An important challenge in 
this work, however, is enforcement and implementation. As the lawyer and scholar 
JJ Rosenbaum has argued, “business entities expand their use of contingent work 
arrangements because these arrangements lower labour costs and in practice often 
shield liability even when the law says otherwise. The power of a joint employer 
liability legal regime – whether USDOL, ILO or any other – rests significantly in the 
effectiveness of its enforcement arm”.27 
Anti-discrimination measures and ‘positive action’: Chapter 5 explained that dis-
crimination on the basis of race, caste and gender is fundamental to forced labour. 
These hierarchies intersect with class and other forms of inequality to heighten 
some people’s vulnerability to exploitation vis-à-vis others’. A systematic political 
response to their heightened vulnerability will necessarily have to address these 
systems root and branch – challenging the patriarchy, racism, white supremacy, and 
so on. Doing so will undoubtedly be complex. But examples of state-led ‘positive ac-
tion’ do exist. Economic reforms include equal pay legislation, recruitment quotas, 
and well-enforced anti-discrimination legislation. ‘Social’ measures with economic 
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effects include parliamentary quotas for previously discriminated against groups, 
reparations, or the provision of preferential public service access. Further initiatives 
can be taken beyond the state-level, and support for community self-organisation 
and collective action is key. The Self-Employed Women’s Association are a great 
example of the power of this in India.28
Restrictions on subcontracting: Subcontracting introduces inherent risks into sup-
ply chains by limiting lead firms’ liability for working conditions and by reinforcing 
low prices as the key to suppliers’ success.29 The evidence documented in this report 
compels us to question whether it will be possible to eradicate forced labour from 
global supply chains without alterating this low-cost business model.
Conclusion
The ILO’s Declaration of Philadelphia (1944) urges that “all human beings, irre-
spective of race, creed or sex, have the right to pursue both their material well-being 
and their spiritual development in conditions of freedom and dignity, of economic 
security and equal opportunity”. These conditions are profoundly undermined by 
the immiserating processes of uneven global neoliberalisation. Those processes, 
which result in clear inequities and injustices, reveal how little “the attainment of 
the conditions in which this shall be possible … constitute the central aim of na-
tional and international policy”. The opposite indeed seems to be the case, with the 
consequence that millions worldwide are being denied the freedom to say no to 
exploitative work.
It is time for that to change. With the Eighth Sustainable Development Goal, the 
world has committed to taking all necessary steps to achieve “decent work for all” 
and to “end forced labour” by the end of the next decade. Alliance 8.7 has been es-
tablished to maintain momentum towards that target, and governments worldwide 
are making pledges that they will meet it. Here, we outline a number of critical 
strategies that can help them to meet that goal. Ultimately, if we are serious about 
addressing unfreedom in the global economy, then we need to think seriously about 
political economy. We need to confront and tackle root causes.
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